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4. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Authority for Jurisdiction: This appeal was granted 
by Order of this Court on March 1, 1988, pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues of law presented here are: 
a. Does the version of the Utah Dram Shop Act in 
effect at the time of the accident apply to those who only 
provide "light" beer as defined by the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act? 
b. Does the Utah Dram Shop Act in effect at the 
time of the accident require that the provider of alcohol 
breach a duty of ordinary care in order to be found liable, 
or does the statute create strict liability? 
c. If the American Legion is found to have 
contributed to the cause of the accident by providing 
alcohol to Wesley Harju, does any comparative negligence on 
Plaintiff's part reduce her right to recover from Defen-
dant? 
d. If the American Legion is found to have 
contributed to the cause of the accident by providing 
alcohol to Wesley Harju, does any negligence on the part of 
Wesley Harju reduce the amount of damages for which American 
Legion may be held liable? 
ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 880031 
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e. If the American Legion is found to have 
contributed to the cause of the accident by providing 
alcohol to Wesley Harju, does any contributory negligence on 
the part of the State of Utah Department of Transportation, 
Clearfield City, or the Utah Power & Light Company reduce 
the amount of damages for which American Legion may be held 
liable? 
f. If the American Legion is found to have 
contributed to the cause of the accident by providing 
alcohol to Wesley Harju, is the American Legion entitled to 
contribution from any other entity which may have contri-
buted to the accident through its own negligence? 
6. STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The statutes, rules or cases in support of Appellant's 
position are as follows: 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. Section 16-6-13.1(8)(d) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 32-1-3 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 32-1-36.5(1)(1) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 32-7-14 
Utah Code Ann. Section 32-7-24(b) and (c) 
Utah Code Arm. Section 32-11-1 et seq. (the Utah Dram Shop 
Act in effect as of January 30, 1985) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 32A-1-22 (1985) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 32A-14-1 et seq. (the Utah Dram Shop 
Act enacted during 1985 session and amended in 1986) 
Utah Code Arm. Section 63-30-8 (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-11 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-38 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-39 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 73-27-40(3) (1953 as amended) 
A copy of these statutes are attached as Appendix A. 
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7. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal of rulings made by the 
Second Judicial District Court of Davis County in a civil damages 
("dram shop") case. The rulings being appealed include a denial 
of the Motion of American Legion Post No. 124 (hereafter "the 
Legion") to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, 
and the granting of Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Oral argument was held October 27, 1987, on Third-Party 
Defendants' Motion; a written Order based on the bench ruling was 
signed by the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District Court Judge 
presiding, on January 6, 1988. This order confirmed an earlier 
ruling entered June 24, 1986. The interlocutory appeal was filed 
January 25, 1988. 
Wesley Harju (hereafter "Harju") consumed approximately 
six beers within a several hour period on January 30, 1985, at 
the Legion. Afterward, as he was driving from the parking lot of 
the Legion, Harju's vehicle struck a pedestrian, Marjorie Allisen 
(hereafter "Allisen"), the Plaintiff in this action, at the 
intersection of State Route 126 and 800 North in Clearfield. 
Allisen was injured as a result of the accident. Allisen brought 
this action against the Legion under Utah Code Ann. Section 32-
11-1 (1), the Utah Dram Shop Act. The Post filed the notices 
ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 880031 
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required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act for claims against 
three governmental entities, Clearfield City (hereafter 
"Clearfield"), Davis County and the State of Utah Department of 
Transportation (hereafter "UDOT"). The Legion brought a Third-
party Complaint against those entities (except Davis County) 
along with Utah Power & Light Company (hereafter "UP&L") and 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph for contribution. The 
Legion's Third-Party Complaint was based upon a claim that the 
reason Harju ran into Allisen was because of negligent design and 
maintenance of the intersection and negligent placement and 
maintenance of a utility pole at said intersection. The Legion 
stipulated to dismissing Mountain Bell after UP&L admitted 
ownership and placement of the utility pole. 
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. I: The version of the Utah Dram Shop Act in 
effect at the time of the accident did not apply to those who 
provided "light" beer as defined by the Utah Liquor Control Act, 
Utah Code Ann., Title 32. The Liquor Control Act contains 
extensive definitions of terms used in that title. Included are 
definitions of "liquor" and "light beer". These definitions are 
mutually exclusive. The Utah Dram shop Act in effect at the time 
of the accident applies to "liquor" and not to "light beer". The 
Legion only served Harju (the driver) "light beer". Thus, the 
ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 880031 
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Legion was not included in the coverage of the Utah Dram Shop 
Act, and this entire action should be dismissed. 
POINT NO. II: The legislative history of the Utah Dram 
Shop makes it evident that the version of that act in effect as 
of January 30, 1985 did not create dram shop liability for giving 
selling or otherwise providing beer. Legislative actions taken 
after the accident show that the Legislature itself was certain 
that the version of the Utah Dram Shop Act in effect in 1985 did 
not cover "light beer'1. In fact, in 1986 the Legislature amended 
the Utah Dram Shop Act to include in its coverage some providers 
of beer. 
POINT NO. Ill: If the Legion is found liable under 
the Utah Dram Shop Act, it is entitled to contribution from other 
tortfeasors who contributed to the accident. The Legislature has 
evidenced support for a variety of social policies which must be 
balanced by the courts in any given situation. It cannot be said 
that the Legislature evidenced, in its adoption of the Utah Dram 
Shop Act, an intent to ignore the general rules regarding 
contribution. Without an explicit showing of such intent, there 
is a presumption that the normal rules regarding contribution 
apply. 
POINT NO. IV: The Legion is entitled to contribution 
despite the fact that the Utah Legislature abolished contribution 
ALLISSN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 330031 
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after the cause of action arose. When the Legislature modified 
the rules regarding contribution it did so in conjunction with 
changes in joint and several liability. It would be grossly 
unfair to deprive a party of the right to contribution from co-
tortfeasors without protecting that party from exposure to 
liability which exceeds its pro rata portion of fault. 
POINT NO. V: The Legion, UDOT and UP&L are "joint 
tortfeasors" within the meaning of the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act. There can be joint tort-feasors in a dram shop 
action. Nothing in the overall statutory scheme precludes such. 
Analogies to Workers1 Compensation are inappropriate. 
POINT NO. VI: The standard of care imposed by the Utah 
Dram Shop Act owed by one who serves alcohol in violation of its 
terms needs to be clarified. There has been some confusion as to 
the standard of care required by the Utah Dram Shop Act. It 
would be extremely helpful for this Court to address those 
questions if a trial in this matter will be necessary. 
9. ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE VERSION OF THE UTAH DRAM SHOP 
ACT IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE 
ACCIDENT DID NOT APPLY TO THOSE WHO 
PROVIDED LIGHT BEER AS DEFINED BY 
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL ACT, UTAH 
CODE ANN., TITLE 32. 
ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 880031 
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The definitions of "light beer" and "liquor" under the 
Utah Liquor Control Act (which is Title 32 of Utah Code Ann. in 
which the Utah Dram shop Act is located) preclude assessing 
liability under its terms for one who only provides "light beer." 
"Light beer" was defined by the Utah Legislature at the time of 
the accident by Utah Code Ann. Section 32-1-3 as having not more 
than 3.2 per centum of alcohol by weight. The definition of 
"liquor" operable at that time, as defined in the same code 
section explicitly excludes "light beer." 
Before Utah Code Ann. Section 32-11-1(1) was repealed 
in 1985 it stated that: 
Any person who gives, sells, or otherwise 
provides intoxicating liquor to another 
contrary to Subsection 16-6-13.1(8)(d), 
subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1), section 32-7-14 
or subsection 32-7-24(b) or (c), and thereby 
causes the intoxication of the other person, 
is liable for injuries in person, property, 
or means of support to any third person, or 
the spouse child or parent of that third 
person, resulting from the intoxication. 
Since the Utah Liquor Control Act specifically excludes "light 
beer" from the definition of "liquor" the Dram Shop Act in effect 
at the time of the accident did not include providers for beer. 
It must be concluded that the Legislature has chosen 
its words carefully. Words and phrases are to be construed as 
they are defined by statute. Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-11. 
"The rule is well established that the General Assembly!s own 
ALLfSEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 830031 
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construction of its language, as provided by definitions, 
controls in the application of a statute. [citations omitted]. 
This definition will be given great weight against any claim that 
application of the statutory definition defeats the general 
purpose of the statute." Ohio Civil Rights Commission y. 
Parklawn Manor, Inc., 41 Ohio St. 2d 47, 50; 322 N.E. 2d 642 
(1975). 
Moreover, the specific statutory provisions included in 
the relevant version of the Dram Shop Act also preclude applica-
tion to the Legion: 
1. Subsection 16-6-13.1(8)(d) applies only to 
establishments with state liquor stores on their premises. That 
subsection also only applies to liquor and wine (items which can 
only be sold publicly in Utah in State Liquor Stores). The 
Legion has no state liquor store. Further, the Legion never 
provided Harju with either liquor or wine. 
2. Subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1) only applies to 
providing liquor or wine to minors. The Legion never provided 
either liquor or wine to Harju, and Harju was not a minor at the 
time of the accident. (The Driver's Report of Traffic Accident 
lists Mr. Harju's birth date as March 11, 1931.) 
3. Section 32-7-14 only applies to those who provide 
alcoholic beverages to persons under the influence of liquor. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that Harju had no other alcoholic 
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beverage the day of the accident other than beer. He was, 
therefore, not under the influence of liquor. 
4. Finally, subsections 32-7-24(b) and (c) apply only 
to providing liquor to persons apparently under the influence of 
liquor. Again, Harju was not under the influence of liquor and 
the Legion provided him none. 
It is apparent that none of the four statutory sub-
sections included in the Dram Shop Act in effect at the time of 
the accident may be said to have been violated by the Legion. 
Therefore, the Legion may not be held to have violated the Act as 
a whole. 
Allisen can only maintain this action against the 
Legion if the plain meanings and definitions set out by the 
Legislature are tortured beyond reason. Although Allisen may be 
able to point out a logical weakness in the overall structure of 
the Dram Shop Act in effect at the time of the accident, the 
remedy for such weakness is for the Legislature to amend the 
statute. That is exactly what was done two year ago, as will be 
discussed in the next section. Meanwhile, to apply those changes 
retroactively deprives the Legion of any notice that their 
conduct could result in liability and thus violates fundamental 
concepts of procedural fairness. 
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POINT NO. II 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UTAH 
DRAM SHOP ACT MAKES IT EVIDENT THAT 
THE VERSION OF THAT ACT IN EFFECT 
AS OF JANUARY 30, 1985 DID NOT 
CREATE DRAM SHOP LIABILITY FOR 
GIVING, SELLING OR OTHERWISE 
PROVIDING BEER. 
If there could have been any doubt as to the Dram Shop 
Act's coverage in January 1985, that doubt was dispelled by the 
Utah State Legislature's subsequent actions with regard to that 
Act. In 1985 the Utah Legislature repealed the old Title 32 and 
replaced it with Title 32A which became effective in July, 1985. 
The Utah Dram Shop Act became Chapter 14 of the new Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act (Title 32A). Dram shop liability was not 
expanded beyond its previous dimensions under the newer Act. 
There had been widespread criticism of the pre-1986 
Dram Shop Act's exclusion of beer from its coverage. Clearfield, 
in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in 
the lower court, included an Affidavit of Jerry D. Fenn. A copy 
of that affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix B. In 1985 Fenn 
chaired the Citizens' Council on Alcoholic Beverage Control 
(hereafter the "Council"). The Council was a statutorily-
created, bi-partisan group formed to consider, investigate and 
inquire into all matters related to the liquor laws of Utah. See 
Utah Code Ann. Section 32A-1-22 (1985). 
ALLISSN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 880031 
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Fenn's Affidavit describes the genesis of the Report 
and Recommendation of the Citizen1s Council on Alcoholic Beverage 
Control to the Utah Legislature. That report is included in 
Fenn's Affidavit. Prepared in the summer of 1985, the Report 
recommended expanding the coverage of the Utah Dram Shop Act to 
include coverage for those who provide beer. The Report states 
at pages 8 and 9: 
The dram shop statute (the "Statute") presently 
creates liability only for those giving, selling or 
otherwise providing "liquor." The Statute does not 
encompass beer. By limiting the statute to "liquor", 
only a small percentage of those who furnish alcoholic 
beverages are subjected to liability. Intoxication 
stemming from the consumption of beer is clearly a 
significant issue facing society. The incidents of 
beer-induced intoxication are not minimal. The Council 
is of the opinion that those who sell, give or other-
wise provide beer to others should not escape the 
consequences for their actions in circumstances where 
those who furnish liquor would be liable. The 
Citizens1 Council recommends an amendment to the 
Statute to encompass all "alcoholic beverages." 
Apparently, because of a vigorous lobbying effort by 
the Utah Grocers' Association, among others, the exclusion for 
beer was not totally abolished. Instead, the Act, as amended in 
1986, provides liability only for any person who directly "gives, 
sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing 
consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage ..." Note 
that providers of "liquor" are still held liable regardless of 
where the liquor is consumed. The broader coverage for those who 
ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 880031 
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provide "alcoholic beverages" (which includes beer) is reserved 
for those providers who allow consumption on their premises. 
This exception excludes grocers and others who sell only beer, 
and who do not allow it to be consumed on their premises. 
The changes adopted by the Utah Legislature in 1986 
clearly show that the Legislature believed that the Dram Shop Act 
in effect in 1985 did cover those who provided only "light beer". 
Their amendment of the statute, in the context of the debate 
taking place at the time, shows that it was felt that the term 
"alcoholic beverages" needed to be used to bring beer under its 
purview. The pre-1986 versions of the Dram Shop Act covered only 
"liquor." Again, it must be presumed that the Legislature says 
what it means and means what it says. Its deliberate effort to 
amend the Dram Shop Act to include beer can only be interpreted 
to mean that the legislature did not believe beer was covered 
prior to that time. 
POINT NO. Ill 
IF THE LEGION IS FOUND LIABLE UNDER 
THE UTAH DRAM SHOP ACT, IT IS 
ENTITLED TO CONTRIBUTION FROM OTHER 
TORTFEASORS WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
ACCIDENT. 
Clearfield and the other third-party defendants, UDOT 
and UP&L, argued below that the legislative intent underlying the 
Utah Dram Shop Act militates against allowing contribution from a 
third-party defendant. It is correct that the Act requires 
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suppliers of intoxicants to assume liability for damages caused 
to third parties by the consumers of those intoxicants. The Dram 
Shop Act, however, does not exist in a vacuum. Other legislative 
pronouncements also apply. 
A substantial cause of the accident injuring Allisen 
was the negligent design and maintenance of the intersection 
where the accident occurred. The Utah State Legislature chose to 
waive governmental immunity specifically for defective, unsafe, 
or dangerous conditions of any highway, road, street, crosswalk 
or sidewalk. Utah Code Ann. Section 63-30-8 (1953, as amended) 
To excuse UDOT and Clearfield for the abominable 
conditions at that intersection simply because they were brought 
into this action by the Legion instead of Allisen would directly 
thwart the Legislature's intent in passing the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Since the only circumstances under which third-
party defendants could be found liable would be if it was 
determined that their negligence caused the accident, and since 
those entities would only be assessed for that portion of a 
verdict which their negligence caused, and since any and all 
contribution would go to Allisen, the intended beneficiary of the 
legislature's protection, the third party defendants should not 
have been dismissed from the lawsuit. 
ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 880031 
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POINT NO. IV 
THE LEGION IS ENTITLED TO CONTRIBU-
TION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE UTAH 
LEGISLATURE ABOLISHED CONTRIBUTION 
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE. 
Clearfield, UDOT, and UP&L also argued in the trial 
court that since the Utah Legislature did away with the right to 
contribution pursuant to Utah comparative negligence statutes 
adopted in 1986, Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-27-38-40, they cannot 
now be liable for contribution. This contention is based upon 
the mistaken notion that since the right to contribution "vests11 
at the time when the tortfeasor has paid more than its pro rata 
share of liability, and since the right to contribution was 
abolished prior to the time when the Legion actually had to write 
out a check to Allisen, that Clearfield, UDOT and UP&L escape all 
liability. 
A tortfeasor may not be able to receive contribution 
from a co-tortfeasor until it actually pays more than its pro 
rata portion of damages, but the common liability upon which the 
co-tortfeasor's obligation rests is created at the time of the 
tortious conduct. In Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Chicago, 
St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 235 Minn. 304, 309; 50 N.W.2d 689, 693; 
cited approvingly in Farmers Insurance Exchange y^_ YJJJjage_of 
Hewitt, 143 N.W.2d 230, 234 (Minn 1966) the court said: 
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... 'Common Liability1 exists immediately 
after the acts of the tortfeasors which give 
rise to a cause of action against them. 
[Citations omitted.] But, in addition to the 
requirement of common liability, the right to 
contribution rests on a payment by one which 
thereby relieves the other from liability. 
Thus, there is a distinction between the common liability which 
underlies the right to contribution and the right to immediate 
payment to fulfill one's obligation to contribute. Clearfield 
obfuscated that distinction in an effort to avoid the conclusion 
that Clearfield's (and the other third-parties') common liability 
existed at the point in time when the condition of the inter-
section caused the accident. The fact that the Legislature 
abolished contribution before the Legion actually had to pay 
Allisen is irrelevant. 
Clearfield's argument below is inconsistent with its 
(and the Legion's) position regarding the applicability of the 
Dram Shop Act to providers of beer. Regarding contribution, 
Clearfield argues that the modification of the Comparative 
Negligence Act ought to be applied to a cause of action which 
arose prior to that modification. In contrast, however, 
Clearfield has correctly argued that later changes to the Dram 
Shop Act demonstrate that the earlier version was in effect at 
the time of the accident. Consistent logic dictates that both 
statutory modifications be prospectively applied. Thus, any 
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change in the Comparative Negligence Act should not affect the 
Legion's right to contribution in this case. 
Clearfield's reliance below on Unigard Insurance Co. v. 
City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984) is misplaced. In 
that case the Utah Supreme Court was faced with the prospect of 
having to dismiss a claim for contribution against a governmental 
agency which allowed a dangerous road condition to develop 
because the city claimed that over a year had elapsed since the 
accident, and, therefore, the Sovereign Immunity Act barred the 
claim. The court refused to dismiss the claim for contribution 
based upon the Utah State Legislature's basic policy underlying 
the Comparative Negligence Act, "which was designed to spread the 
loss for injuries among all who are responsible." Id. at 1346. 
Spreading the loss for Allisen's injuries to all who are respon-
sible for them requires reversing third-party defendants' 
dismissal. 
If the third-party defendants' dismissal is not 
reversed, a most unjust situation could be created. Because the 
Legion was sued before contribution was modified, conceivably, 
the Legion could be held jointly and severally liable for the 
entirety of Allisen's damages (less the approximately $52,000 
already paid by Harju's insurance carrier). This could occur 
despite the fact the Legion may have only been slightly respon-
sible for those injuries. Such a result would flip on its head 
ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST Case No. 880031 
NO. 134, et al. 
Appellant1s Brief 
-23-
the Legislature's purpose in doing away with contribution, 
coupled with reducing exposure to liability to that proportion 
representing its fault. 
POINT NO. V 
THE LEGION, UDOT AND UP&L ARE 
"JOINT TORTFEASORS" WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE UTAH COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE ACT. 
Clearfield, UDOT and UP&L based their Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the argument that they ought not be held 
liable for contribution because they were not "joint tortfeasors" 
with the Legion, and, therefore, could not be liable under Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-27-39 (1953, as amended). The statutory 
definition of "joint tort-feasor" found in Section 78-27-40(3) 
states: "As used in this section, !joint tort-feasor1 means one 
of two or more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for 
the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment 
has been recovered against all or some of them." Under this 
definition and the facts as taken for purposes of this appeal, 
third-party defendants are certainly "joint tort-feasors" with 
the Legion. 
Prosser has described the confusion and uncertainty 
which surround the terms "joint tort" and "joint tort-feasors". 
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, Section 46 (1984). There described 
are the various meanings given to those terms. An example of 
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such diversity is apparent in the recent Utah Supreme Court 
decision of Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1986). The 
Court was faced with the question of whether an employer, 
vicariously liable for an automobile accident involving his 
employee, was to be considered a joint tort-feasor for purposes 
of contribution. Despite the employer's contention that since he 
was only derivatively liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, the Court held that the employer was a joint tort-
feasor. In doing so the Court relied upon the definition 
contained in Section 78-27-40(3) at issue here. The Court cited 
approvingly the case of Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748 
(Del. 1978): 
The basis of liability is not relevant, nor 
is the relationship among those libel for the 
tort. In short, it makes no difference 
whether the [master's] liability is based 
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior or 
any other legal concept. The point is that 
both it and the [servant] are (at least) 
"severally" liable for the same injury to 
plaintiff . . . (emphasis in original). 
Contrast that definition with the discussion of the 
basis for contribution under joint liability in Farmers Insurance 
Exchange v. Village of Hewitt, 143 N.W.2d at 233. That case was 
also a dram shop action. The would-be contributor defended by 
arguing that it could not be held liable for contribution since 
its possible liability was statutorily distinct from that of the 
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seeker of contribution (similar to Clearfield's arguments here). 
The Court rejected that argument and required contribution 
saying, "Contribution rests on common liability, not on joint 
negligence or joint tort. Common liability exists when two or 
more actors are liable to an injured party for the same damages, 
even though their liability may rest on different grounds." Id. 
It is interesting that while the Minnesota Court distinguished 
"common liability" from "joint tort", the definition it gave for 
"common liability" is virtually identical to the Utah statutory 
definition of "joint tort-feasor". Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-
40(3). 
Clearfield attempted to bolster its argument below by 
analogizing Dram Shop Act liability to Workers' Compensation 
liability. Citing Phillips v. Union Pacific Railroad Company v. 
Hammary Furniture, 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980), Clearfield reasoned 
that since an employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor with regard 
to one of its employees, that a third-party cannot be a joint 
tort-feasor with a Dram Shop under a civil damages statute. 
Phillips is inapposite for a variety of reasons. To summarize, 
however, these distinctions exist between Workers' Compensation 
and the Utah Dram Shop Act: 
1. Workers' Compensation is an insurance statute; the 
Dram Shop Act defines a tort. As the Phillips Court held, "Our 
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statute defines joint tort-feasor as one of two or more persons 
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury. The 
liability of the employer [under Worker's Compensation] is not 
tort liability at all, but only required that the injured 
employee be in the course and scope of the employment." 
(emphasis in original) Phillips at 154. Regardless of whether 
liability is based upon a negligence standard or strict liability 
(a question discussed in the next section) a Dram Shop operator 
must engage in some wrongful conduct in order for liability to 
result. That, of course, is not true for an employer to be found 
liable under Workers' Compensation. Dram Shop Act liability, 
then, is surely similar enough to negligence under the govern-
mental Immunity Act to allow for joint liability between the two. 
2. Workers' Compensation remedies generally provide 
specified number of weeks of an employee's salary in exchange for 
the loss of a particular appendage or organ. In contrast, Dram 
Shop liability results in traditional tort measures of damages. 
3. Workers' Compensation sets the limits of an 
employer's liability, while the Dram shop Act in effect at the 
time of the accident did not. To allow contribution from an 
employer might permit an employee to exceed that liability 
ceiling. No such difficulty exists under the Dram Shop Act. 
Dram Shop Act liability is more akin to the master-
servant vicarious liability which allowed contribution under 
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Krukiewicz than Workersf Compensation which precluded contribu-
tion under Phillips. The distinction between common law tort 
liability and liability under the Dram Shop Act which Clearfield, 
UDOT and UP&L urged in the court below is both nonexistent and 
irrelevant. Joint liability ought be allowed with a right of 
contribution between the Legion and Clearfield, UDOT and UP&L. 
POINT NO. VI 
THE STANDARD OF CARE IMPOSED BY THE 
UTAH DRAM SHOP ACT OWED BY ONE WHO 
SERVES ALCOHOL IN VIOLATION OF ITS 
TERMS NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIEp. 
This final point will doubtless appear a strange one 
for the Legion to be raising at this point. Consideration of 
judicial economy requires it be raised now, since failing to do 
so might very well result in the necessity of another appeal 
after trial (if a trial is ordered at all given the arguments 
related to the inapplicability of the Dram Shop Act to the 
Legion). 
The lower court held in its June 24, 1986, ruling that the 
Utah Dram Act is a negligence-based statute, meaning that the 
provider of the intoxicants must provide the alcohol in a 
negligent manner before liability attaches. Allisen cited 
authority from several jurisdictions in her Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion to Strike Defense for the proposition that 
Dram statutes impose strict liability without negligence. 
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Wi11iams v Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 19 7 2); Feuerherm v. 
Ertelt, 286 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1979); Nelson v. Araiza, 372 N.E.2d 
637 (111. 1977). This authority was also cited for the proposi-
tion that comparative negligence is inapplicable and irrelevant. 
While the District Court's position that negligence 
must be shown favors the Legion, it would be opportune for this 
Court to review that standard at this time. If the thrust of 
this appeal fails, and the Utah Dram shop is held to apply to 
providers of beer in 1985, it would be of benefit to all to know 
with certainty what the standard of care owed should be under the 
Dram Shop Act. That way, if a trial is held the parties can 
present evidence appropriate to that level of care and avoid the 
possibility of another appeal later, as well as the possibility 
of yet another trial. 
10. CONCLUSION 
A single finding that the Dram Shop Act in effect at 
the time of the accident complained of herein does not apply to 
suppliers of "beer", and therefore the Legion in this case, would 
dispense of all issues. The plain meaning of the statute and its 
legislative history both strongly support that position. If, 
however, this Court is not persuaded to dismiss this action on 
that basis, then guidance is needed regarding issues of contribu-
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tion, joint and several liability, apportioning of damages and 
finally, the standard of care required by the Utah Dram Shop Act, 
and whether comparative negligence applies. 
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16-6-13.1 CORPORATIONS 
revoke club charter and fine club for 
certain violations of Liquor Control Act 
does not impliedly repeal this section giv-
ing the secretary of state similar powers 
where he finds a violation of the statutes 
under which the charter was granted, the 
two laws, in combination, do not constitute 
unconstitutional excessne lines and pun-
ishments. Bowling Club \ Toronto, 17 
U. (2d) 5, 403 P. 2d 651. 
Failure to participate in hearing. 
Bowling club which failed to participate 
m relocation hearing waived right to 
claim secretary of state erred in basing 
his decision to revoke on unsworn testi-
mony. Bowling Club v. Toronto, 17 U. 
(2d) 5, 403 P. 2d 651. 
Municipal regulation. 
By enacting statute providing for regu-
lation by secretary of state of clubs on 
whose premises liquor is stored and con-
sumed, legislature did not intend to pre-
clude municipal corporation from licens-
ing and regulating nonprofit social clubs, 
e\en though liquor is stoied and consumed 
on then respective premises, thereby sub-
jecting them also to regulation by secre-
tary of state. Salt Lake City v. Towne 
House Athletic Club, 18 U. (2d) 417, 424 
P. 2d 442. 
City ordinance regulating and licensing 
nonprofit clubs or associations, which es-
tablished the same requirements for license 
as state did for charter arid which pro-
vided for revocation of license m sub-
stantially the same teims as state law 
providing for revocation o^ charter, was 
unconstitutional as encroaching upon juris-
diction of secretary of statej State v. Salt 
Lake City, 21 U (2d) 318, 445 P. 2d 691, 
distinguished at 25 U. (^d) 333, 481 
P. 2d 669 
Collateral References. 
C l u b s ^ ^ , Intoxicating L^quors^^lS. 
14 CJ.S. Clubs § 4 , 48 CJ.S. Intoxicat-
ing Liquors §§38, 39. 
Licensing of social clubs, 45 Am. Jur. 2d 
577, Intoxicating Liquors § 130. 
Status and rights of on0 renting room 
in club, 32 A. L. R. 1016. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Construction prior to amendment. 
Where secretary of state sent notice of 
hearing on l evocation of charter to corpo-
rate officers instead ot corporation itself 
it was a deviation tiom the notice require-
ment (prior to the 1955 amendment), but 
tested by the "fair play" theory of due 
process, the corporation had actual notice, 
appeared at the hearing, and was afforded 
opportunity to defend against the charges 
brought. Entie Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 U. 
(2d) 98, 287 P. 2d 670. 
Although this section (prior to amend-
ment) provided no means of giving the no-
tice required it did not follow that the 
Rules of Civil Procedure governed the is-
suance of process, the Ifcules were for 
formal contests between adverse parties 
and clearly were inapplicable to a pro-
ceeding befoie an administrative body 
seeking to regulate activities burdened 
with a public interest. Entre Nous Club 
v. Toronto, 4 U. (2d) 98, 2^7 P. 2d 670. 
16-6-13.1. Clubs storing or permitting consumption of liquor on premises 
—Bond—Filing of articles, bylaws and house rules—Federal malt liquor 
revenue stamp—Establishment of state liquor store—Restrictions.—(1) 
Every social club, recreational or athletic association, or kindred associa-
tion, incorporated under the provisions of this chapter, which now main-
tains or intends to maintain premises upon which liquor | is or will be 
stored or consumed must procure and file with the Utah liquor control com-
mission and maintain thereafter a cash or corporate surety bond payable 
to the state of Utah, in the amount of $7500. The bond shall be in any 
form approved by the attorney general and shall be conditioned upon the 
iaithful compliance by the nonprofit corporation, its officers, agents, and 
employees with the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Liquor Control 
Act of 1969 as amended, and regulations of the commission adopted there-
under No part of any cash bond so posted may be withdrawn either during 
the period the license is in effect, or while revocation proceedings are pend-
ing against the licensee, or for a period of six months thereafter. A bond 
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filed by a licensee under the provisions of this section shall be forfeited if 
the license of a licensee is finally revoked. Upon final revocation, the at-
torney general shall undertake necessary procedures to collect the bond 
and pay the proceeds to the state treasurer. 
(2) Each club or association required by this chapter to file a $7500 
bond shall submit a copy of its articles, bylaws and house rules to the 
Utah liquor control commission, and each club or association shall abide 
by and conform to its articles, bylaws and house rules. A copy of the 
articles, bylaws and house rules and any amendments thereto shall be kept 
on file with the Utah liquor control commission at all times. 
(3) All social clubs, recreational, athletic or kindred associalions organ-
ized pursuant to this chapter which have procured and filed a $7,500 bond 
as required by this section and which have on file with the Utah liquor 
control commission a copy of their articles, bylaws and house rules, and 
are abiding by them and the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Liquor 
Control Act of 1969 and regulations of the commission adopted thereunder, 
may hold a United States retail malt liquor revenue stamp and at the 
same time permit members to have, hold, store or possess liquor in or on 
premises described in such stamp. 
(4) The so-called "locker system" for the storage and serving of 
intoxicating liquors shall be legal in this state only when operated by a 
nonprofit corporation in compliance with the terms and provisions of this 
chapter and the provisions of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, and 
the regulations of the commission adopted thereunder. 
(5) Under the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, the regulations 
adopted thereunder, and the provisions of this chapter, the Utah liquor 
control commission may establish a state store on premises of a social 
club, recreation, athletic or other kindred association. 
(6) Any social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred associa-
tion seeking to have a state liquor store located on its premises, shall have 
a valid license issued by the Utah liquor control commission, file a written 
application with the commission in the form prescribed, accompanied by 
an application fee of $25, the written consent of the local authority as 
defined in the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, satisfactory documentary 
proof that the applicant is currently licensed to and does operate a place 
where a variety of hot food is prepared and cooked and complete meals 
are served in connection with indoor dining accommodations, satisfactory 
proof that the applicant is in compliance with the provisions of this chapter 
and the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, and the regulations adopted 
thereunder, and that the proposed vendor can qualify for and obtain the 
bond specified in section 32-1-37 of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969 
Every application shall contain a scaled floor plan of the social club, 
recreational, athletic, or other kindred association, including that part 
thereof in which applicant proposes that a state store be established and 
shall set forth any other information as the commission may direct If a 
state store is so established, liquor or wine may not be stored or sold in 
any other place than as designated and approved by the commission. 
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(7) The Utah liquor control commission may refuse to locate a state 
liquor store in any social club, recreational, athletic, or otheit kindred 
association whose officer, director, managing agent or employee has been 
convicted of a felony or of violation of any ordinance, state or federal law 
concerning the sale, delivery or transportation of an alcoholic beverage, or 
who has forfeited bond to appear in court to answer charges of having 
committed a felony or having violated any such laws or ordinances, or has 
pleaded guilty to a charge of having committed a felony, or ha£ violated 
any such law or ordinance, or who has been convicted of any crime in-
volving moral turpitude. 
(8) In those instances where a state liquor store is established on 
premises occupied by a social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred 
association, the following restrictions shall apply: 
(a) The state liquor store must remain locked at all times ^vhen it is 
not open for business. 
(b) The state store shall not stock or sell any liquor except m original 
unbroken containers. 
(c) No minor shall be employed by any vendor to sell or dispense any 
alcoholic beverage. 
(d) No vendor, officer, director, managing agent or employee, nor 
any other person employed by or acting for or in behalf of any licensee, 
shall sell, deliver or furnish, or cause or permit to be sold, delivered or 
furnished any liquor or wine to : 
(i) Any minor; 
(ii) Any person actually, apparently or obviously drunk ; 
(iii) Any known habitual drunkard; 
(iv) Any known interdicted person. 
(e) Every lease, contract or other arrangement under which a state 
store is established in a social club, recreational, athletic or other kindred 
association shall be in writing and contain a provision to the effect that it 
is terminable at the option of the state, with or without cause, and with-
out liability of any kind to the state. 
(f) There shall be no advertising or other rerference to the sale of 
liquor, except as provided in section 32-1-36.5 (n). 
(g) No liquor or wine shall be sold or offered for sale at said stores 
during the following hours: 
(i) On any day of a general or primary election until afte^r the time 
when the polls are closed. 
(ii) On Sunday and legal holidays after 12:00 midnight and prior 
to 12:00 noon. 
(h) No provision in this act or the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, 
shall be construed to prevent a social club, recreational, athletic or other 
kindred association which is licensed to and does operate a place where 
a variety of hot food is prepared and cooked and complete meals are 
served in connection with indoor dining accommodations, or a restaurant, 
from purchasing, storing or using flavoring and cooking wihes, liqueur 
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and cordials Tor flavoring and cooking purposes, but no sucli wines, liqueurs 
or cordials shall be sold as a beverage. 
History: C. 1953, 16-6-13.1, enacted by 
L. 1955, ch. 25, § 2; L. 1969, ch. 37, § 4. 
CompUer's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment rewrote this sec-
tion which provided for a $5,000 bond filed 
with the secretary of state, dictated the 
form of the bond and enumerated items to 
be included in the club's constitution, by-
laws and/or house rules; the amendment 
divided the section into numbered sub-
sections, in subsec. (4) added "and the 
provisions of the Utah Liquor Control 
Act * * # adopted thereunder" and added 
subsecs. (5) to (8). 
Constitutionality. 
Although provision regarding the "locker 
system" for storing and serving liquor 
is amendatory of sections 32-1-8 and 32-7-3 
of the Liquor Control Act there is no 
violation of the constitutional prohibition 
against the passage of a bill containing 
more than one subject (Art. VI , §23 ) , 
since the amended sections relate directly 
to the general subject of the act. Kent 
Club v. Toronto, 6 U. (2d) 67, 305 P . 2d 
870. 
Act was not unconstitutionally discrim-
inatory on ground that $3,000 bond was so 
high that only financially affluent clubs 
could afford it. Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 
U. (2d) 07, 305 P. 2d 870. 
Forfeiture of bond. 
Where nonprofit corporation pleaded 
guilty to violation of state liquor law, 
action of court in fining corporation 
$1,000 did not affect corporation's liability 
under its bond given to the secretary of 
state and did not preclude forfeiture of 
bond posted in accordance wtih the statute. 
Disabled American Veterans ' Club v. To-
ronto, 12 U. (2d) 213, 364 P . 2d 830. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
C onstitutionality. 
Former requirements that club charter 
contain limitations on "number of mem-
bers consistent" with the nature and pur-
poses of the club, provide for "leasonable 
initiation fees and dues," have "reasonable 
regulations for the dropping of members 
for nonpayment of dues or for other 
causes," and have "strict regulations" for 
the government of the club rooms or 
quarters consistent with the nature and 
purpose of the club were not unconstitu-
tionally uncertain and ambiguous. Kent 
Club v. Toronto, 6 U. (2d) 67, 305 P . 2d 
870. 
16-6-13.2. Clubs storing or permitting consumption of liquor on premises 
—Existing clubs.—All existing social clubs, recreational or athletic asso-
ciations or kindred associations, incorporated under the provisions of this 
chapter, may within sixty days immediately following the effective date 
of this act file an application with the commission which it must either 
grant or deny within six months from the date of filing. Any authorization 
issued by the secretary of state, permitting members to have, hold, store 
or possess liquor in or on club or association premises shall terminate on 
the date the commission grants or denies the applicaton for a license filed 
hereunder. The authorization of any such club or association not filing 
an application within the sixty-day period, shall terminate at midnight 
on the sixtieth day following the effective date of this act. 
History: C. 1953, 16-6-13.2, enacted by 
L. 1955, ch. 25, § 3 ; L. 1969, ch. 37, §10. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "may 
within sixty days * * * sixtieth day fol-
lowing the effective date of this act" 
for "shall have thir ty days after the 
effective date of this act to comply with 
the terms thereof." 
Chapter 37, Laws 1969, carried no effec-
tive date clause. 
16-6-13.3. Repealing and separability clause.—All statutes or parts 
thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. If any section or pro-
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tutional as against contentions that it ere- Purpose of act. 
ated monopoly, constituted levy of tax The purpose of the former Prohibition 
not for public purpose, was private law, L a w w a s n o t only to prevent traffic in 
and that it was violation of due process intoxicating liquors, but also to prevent 
of law clause. Utah Manufacturers' Assn. transportation. State v. Davis, 55 U. 54 
v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 229. i 8 4 p. 161# ' 
32-1-2. Deemed exercise of police powers—Liberally construed.—This 
act shall be deemed an exercise of the police powers of the state for the 
protection of the public health, peace and morals; to prevent the recur-
rence of abuses associated with saloons; to eliminate the evils of unlicensed 
and unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic beverages; 
and all provisions of this act shall be liberally construed for the attainment 
of these purposes. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 2; C. 1943, CoUateral References. 
46-0-44. Intoxicating Liquors<^6. 
Effect * legislative aedaration. « « S . Into^cating L ^ s J ^ 
Mere declaration by legislature that an
 u o r s a 23. 
act is within exercise of police power is 
not binding on courts unless it is within Law Review. , 
the recognized scope of such power. That California v. La Rue (93 Sup. (Jt. 390)— 
the prohibition or regulation of alcohol The Supreme Court's New Overbreadth 
and other intoxicating liquors is an exer- Doctrine, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 320. 
cise of the police power of the state ad-
mits of no doubt. Utah Manufacturers' 
Assn. v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 229. 
32-1-3. Definitions.—As used in this act: 
"Alcoholic beverage" means and includes "beer" and "liquor" as they 
are defined herein. 
"Application" means a formal written request for the issuance of a 
permit or license. 
"Beer" means any beverage containing not less than one-half of one per 
centum of alcohol by weight and obtained by the alcoholic fermentation 
of an infusion or decoction of any malted grain or similar products. "Heavy 
beer" means beer containing more than 3.2 per centum of alcohol by weight. 
"Light beer" means beer containing not more than 3.2 per centum of 
alcohol by weight. Beer may or may not contain hops or other vegetable 
products. "Beer" includes ale, stout and porter. 
"Brewer" means any person engaged in manufacturing beer. 
"Commission" means "Utah liquor control commission." 
"Council" means citizens' council. 
"Dentist" means a person holding a valid and unrevoked license to 
practice dentistry under the laws of the state of Utah. 
"Druggist" or "pharmacist" means any person holding a valid and 
unrevoked license as a registered pharmacist under the laws of the state 
of Utah and who is actually in good faith engaged in the business of 
compounding and dispensing drugs or medicines. 
"Drugstore" or "pharmacy" shall be as defined by the statutes of Utah. 
"Interdicted person" means a person to whom the sale of liqtior is pro-
hibited by an order made under this act. 
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"Liquor" means and includes alcohol, or any alcoholic, spirituous, 
vinous, fermented, malt, or other liquid or combination of liquids, a part 
of which is spirituous, vinous, or fermented, and all other drinks or 
drinkable liquids, containing more than one-half of one per centum of 
alcohol by weight; and all mixtures, compounds or preparations, whether 
liquid or not, which contain more than one-half of one per centum of alcohol 
by weight, and which are capable of human consumption; except that 
the term "liquor" shall not include "light beer." 
"Local authority" means (a) the board of county commissioners of the 
county in which the premises are located if the premises are located in an 
unincorporated area of the county or (b) the governing body of the 
city or town in which the premises are located if the premises are located 
in an incorporated city or town. 
"Manufacture" means to distill, brew, rectify, blend, mix, compound, 
process, ferment, or otherwise make any alcoholic beverage as defined 
in this act. 
"Minor" means any person under the age of twenty-one years. 
"Package" shall mean any container, bottle, vessel, or other receptacle 
immediately containing liquor. 
"Package agency" means an outlet authorized by the commission to sell 
original package liquor or wine for consumption off the premises. 
"Person" includes any individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, as-
sociation, or any group or combination, and the plural as well as the singu-
lar number, unless the intent to give a more limited meaning is disclosed by 
the context. 
"Physician" means a person holding a valid and unrevoked license to 
practice medicine and surgery in the state of Utah. 
"Premises" means any room, enclosure, building or structure where 
alcoholic beverages may be lawfully manufactured, stored, sold, or consumed 
as provided in this act. 
"Prescription" means a writing in the form prescribed by the regula-
tions, signed by a physician, and given by him to a patient for the obtaining 
of liquor pursuant to this act for use for medicinal purposes only. 
"Public place" shall mean and include any place, building or convey-
ance, to which the public has, or is permitted to have access, and any 
highway, street, lane, park or place of public resort or amusement, and 
any other place which, under the provisions of this act, has been declared to 
be a public place. 
"Regulations" means regulations made by the commission. 
"Residence" means and includes any building, or part of a building, 
where a person resides, but shall not include any part of a building which 
is not actually and exclusively used as a private residence, nor any part of 
a hotel other than a private guest room, nor a club or any part thereof, 
nor any place from which there is access to a club or hotel except through 
a street or lane or other open and unobstructed means of access, nor any 
portion of a building used in part for business purposes unless such portion 
is separated from the part used for business purposes by a wall or walls 
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having no doors or other means of access opening into such part used 
for business purposes. 
"Restaurant" means a place of business where a variety of hot food 
is prepared and cooked and complete meals are served to the general 
public in connection with indoor dining accommodations. 
"Retailer" means any person engaged in the sale or distribution of 
alcoholic beverages to \he consumer. 
"Sell" or "to sell" when used in this act in any prohibition, shall be con-
strued to include: to solicit or receive an order for; to keep or expose for 
sale; to deliver for value; to peddle; to possess with intent to sell; to 
traffic in; for any consideration, promised or obtained, directly or indirectly, 
or under any pretext or by any means whatsoever, to procure or allow 
to be procured for any other person; and "sale," when so used, shall 
include every act of selling as above defined. 
"State store" shall mean an outlet for the bale of liquor located on 
premises owned or leased by the state of Utah. 
"Wholesaler" means any person other than a manufacturer, engaged 
in the importation for sale, or in the sale of alcoholic beverages in whole-
sale or jobbing quantities to the commission or to retailers. 
* "Wine" includes any alcoholic beverage obtained by the fermentation 
of the natural sugar content of fruits, plants, honey or milk, whether or 
not other ingredients are added. 
History; 3X 1935, ch. 43, § 3; C. 1943, tion, even if nonintoxicating, is a proper 
46-0-45; L. 1969, ch. 83, §2. subject for the exercise of the state's po-
lice power is undoubted. Riggins v. Dis-
Compiler's Notes. trict Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 
The 1969 amendment inserted "Council," 183, 51 P. 2d 645. 
"Local authority," "Minor," "Pack-igc 
agency," "Premises," "Restaurnnt," and CoUateral References. 
"State store" in the list of definitions; Intoxicating LiquorsC=>122. 
and deleted "or gratuitously" after "val- 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 201. 
uc" in the definition of "Sell" or "to sell." 45 Am. Jur. 2d 488, Intoxicating Liq. 
"Light beer" defined. 
That light beer as defined in this scc-
uors § 4. 
32-1-4. Nonpartisan.—It is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
state that the administration of this act shall be nonpartisan. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §4; 0. 1943, 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 192. 
46-0-46. 45 Am. Jur. 2d 488, Intoxicating Liq. 
uors § 3. Collateral References. 
Intoxicating Liquors€=>lll. 
32-1-5. Liquor control commission—Members—Terms—Compensation-
Vacancies—Oath and bond—Quorum.—(a) Upon approval of this act the 
term of office of the present liquor control commission shall expire. 
Thereafter the liquor control commission shall be comprised of three com-
missioners to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. 
Immediately upon approval of this act the governor shall appoint one 
commissioner to hold office for a period of two years, one to hold office 
for a period of four years, and one to hold office for a period of six years. 
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liability or loss on account of damage to or destruction of property of any 
or every description, including liability of the commission for the resultant 
loss of use of such property, resulting from accident due to the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of any such motor vehicle. The commission shall 
be liable to respond in damages in all such cases if a private corporation 
under the same circumstances would be liable. 
(b) The written consent of the governor as required by section 32-1-28 
shall not be required to proceed against the commission under this section. 
The provisions set forth in chapter 30 of Title 63 shall apply in all actions 
so commenced; however, immunity from suit against the council or the 
qommission, or against any official, officer, examiner or member of the 
council or commission, is in all respects retained except as provided in 
section 32-1-26 of this act, and for damages sustained as a result of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of motor vehicles as set forth in subsection 
(a) of this section. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §37 ; C. 1943, section designation " ( a ) " ; and added 
46-0-79; L. 1969, ch. 83, § 11. subsee. (b) . 
Compilers Notes. Collateral References. 
The 1969 amendment inserted the sub- Intoxicating Liquors<$=3lll. 
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 192. 
32-1-36. State stores.—Unless otherwise prohibited, stores to be known 
as state liquor stores may be established by the commission at such places 
m the state as considered advisable for the sale of liquor in accordance 
with the provisions of this act and the regulations made thereunder. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §38 ; C. 1943, distribution of intoxicating liquors. Arti-
46-0-80. cle XII , § 20 of the Constitution does not 
apply to the state. Riggins v. District 
Legal authority to sell "hard" liquor. Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 183, 
By the Liquor Control Act the exclu- 5 1 p - 2d 645. 
j,ive right to sell intoxicating beverages, 
other than light beer, is in the state. Collateral References. 
Higgms v. District Court of Salt Lake Intoxicating LiquorsC=»128. 
County, 89 U. 183, 51 P. 2d 645. 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 211. 
45 Am. Jur . 2d 644, Intoxicating Liquors 
Validity. § 228. 
There is nothing in our state Consti-
tution which prohibits the state legis- Constitutionality of s tatutes providing 
Uture from enacting a law putt ing the for sale of intoxicating liquor by a state 
.tite into the liquor business; or to pre- or state agencies, 121 A. L. K. 300. 
\ent it from engaging in the sale and 
32-1-36.5. State store on premises occupied by restaurant—Restric-
tions.—In those instances where a state liquor store is established on 
premises occupied by a restaurant, the following restrictions shall apply: 
(a) The consent of the local authority shall first be obtained. 
(b) The stock of alcoholic beverages shall be so stored as not to be 
usible to patrons of the restaurant. 
(c) Liquor or wine shall not be purchased for or served to any guest 
or patron of any restaurant by the vendor or by a person employed by 
or in any manner for or in his behalf. Purchases must be made by the 
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guest or patron at the site of the store approved by the commission and not 
^ d r No liquor or wine shall be sold or offered for sale at said stores 
d
^ ^ t ! ^ ^ » ^ - F*«* eleCti°n UDtil ^ ^ tlme 
W V e o f s u n i r a n d legal holidays after 12:00 o'clock midnight, and 
VTiV)° r i ° y X n 0 d a y after 12:00 o'clock midnight and prior to 4:00 
° '
C l ( ? P S e state liquor store must remain locked at all times when it 
is not open for business.
 t i n o r i g i n a l 
m The state store shall not stocK or sen airy "H *-
(t) inebi,ai.c „„„+0„t0 nf which do not exceed two (Z) fluid 
d
° t ) e X Z y Z ™ ^ -o purchased shall not be removed from the 
" T r ^ a n f r e s t a u r a n t licensed to sell draft beer the dispensing facili-
•
 (
 I ii !t hfvisible to <mests or patrons in the dining area of the 
S a t V a ^ s U t e ^ I n not be s^ld or served or consumed at a bar 
" If "ifSS -«e» containerS S ° l d at ^ SUOh ^^  S t ° r e ^ 
to
^r^«^^^'^ « P - h a s e d except in connection (j) Liquor_or wi i
 a l a a 5 e r v e d a t such restaurant 
"" V ) " N o " fno, *aU be e S y e d by any retailer or vendor to s«U . 
d T , r No t X r e S proprietor, partner, officer agent or empl.ve, (1) No Tenaop, " - ,
 s h a l l s e l l dehver or furnish, or 
! 7 o r T S t to
 b « s o K u » e r e P d or furnished, any li,»or or win. to: 
S I n y p t o n aetuaUy, apparently or obviously drunk, 
(3) Any known habitual drunkard; 
(4) Any known interdicted person. 
m\ Every lease, contract or other arrangement under which a state 
(m) fcvery leas ,
 h u b e i n ^ f o g a n d shall contain a 
store " £ « £ * £ t h r a e t T i s terminable at the option of the state, with 
r w X u t l t r a n r t i t h o u t l i a b i l i t y o f a n y l d n d t o t h e s t a t e 
(T There shall be no advertising or other reference to the sale of (n) There snail
 s t a t e m e n t o f availability, the content and 
S ^ w h i T C b t n ^ U v e d by the commission, may be attached to 
or carried on the menu. 
rtCO 0 0 - «,- * enacted by by county ordinance stating that planning History: C. 1953, 32-1-36.5, enacted oy ^ y ^ y^^
 Qf p e t i t i o n t 0 o p e r a t e g t a U 
L. 1969, ch. 83, § 28. liquor store is appealable to district court* 
Effect of county ordinance. ^ ^ 4 T*&S&" " C a n n 0 n ' * 
County commission has no authority to V. (2d) 56, 484 P. 2d 1184. 
dictate to district court its junsdicUon 
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History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 125; C. 1943, and inserted "if otherwise required by 
46-0-167; L. 1969, ch. 83, §20, 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment inserted "or air-
line" near the beginning of the section; 
law" near the end of the section. 
CoUateral References. 
Intoxicating Liquors<§=3lll. 
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 192. 
45 Am. Jur. 2d 503, Intoxicating Liq. 
uors § 24. 
32-7-13. Drinking and drunkenness in public places.—No person shall 
drink liquor in a public building, park or stadium or be in an intoxicated 
condition in a public place. 
defendant was justified though offense 
for which he was arrested was not com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting 
officer. The defendant, being intoxicated 
in a public place in violation of this 
section, and upon death of his passengers 
was charged with automobile homicide 
under 76-30-7.4. State v. Bryan, 16 TJ 
(2d) 47, 395 P. 2d 539. 
CoUateral References. 
Drunkards<S=>10. 
28 C.J.S. Drunkards § 14. 
45 Am. Jur. 2d 512, Intoxicating Liq. 
uors § 36. 
Location of offense as "public" with-
in requirement of enactments against 
drunkenness, 8 A. L. R. 3d 930. 
Modern status of the rules as to volun-
tary intoxication as defense to criminaj 
charge, 8 A. L. R. 3d 1236. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §126; 1937, 
ch. 49, § 1 ; C. 1943, 46-0-168. 
Comptter's Notes. 
The 1937 amendment inserted "drink 
liquor in a public building, park or 
stadium or." 
Operation of motor vehicle while in-
toxicated. 
Following an automobile collision, de-
fendant was sitting on curb holding a 
handkerchief to his head which was bleed-
ing; there was a strong odor of alcohol 
on his breath; he appeared to be intoxi-
cated and in fact stated that he was 
drunk. A bottle containing whiskey was 
found on the floor of his automobile. He 
was taken to a nearby hospital where his 
wounds were attended and he was placed 
under arrest for operating a motor ve-
hicle while intoxicated in violation of 41-
6-44. Under such circumstances arrest of 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Drunkenness and intoxication. 
Under Prohibition Law of 1917, drunk-
enness and intoxication by use of intoxi-
cating liquors was criminal, and a mis-
demeanor, wherever and whenever occur, 
ring at any place in the state. Kolb v 
Peterson, 50 U. 450, 168 P. 97. 
32-7-14. Sale of liquor to drunken person.—No person shall sell or 
supply any alcoholic beverages or permit alcoholic beverages to be sold or 
supplied to any person under or apparently under the influence of liquor. 
45 Am. Jur. 2d 669, Intoxicating Liq. 
uors § 265. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 127; C. 1943, 
46-0-169. 
CoUateral References. 
Intoxicating Liquors<@=al61. 
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 258. 
Criminal responsibility of one author-
ized generally to sell intoxicating liquors 
for particular illegal sale thereof by em-
ployee or agent, 139 A. L. R. 306. 
32-7-15. Selling or supplying alcoholic beverages to minor prohibited— 
Exception.—(1) No person shall sell or supply alcoholic beverages to any 
person under the age of 21 years. 
(2) This section does not apply to the supplying of liquor to a person 
under the age of 21 years for medicinal purposes by the parent or guardian 
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32-7-23. Possession of false or fictitious permit.—Except ais provided 
by this act and the regulations, no person shall within this state have or 
keep in his possession a false or fictitious permit purporting t<() authorize 
the purchase of liquor or a permit of which he is not the holder. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 136; C. 1943, 
16-0-178. 
32-7-24. Permitting drunkenness.—No person shall: 
(a) permit drunkenness to take place in any house or on any premises 
of which he is the owner, tenant or occupant; or 
(b) permit or suffer any person apparently under the influence of 
liquor to consume any liquor in any house or on any premises of which 
the first-named person is owner, tenant or occupant; or 
(c) give any liquor to any person apparently under the influence of 
liquor. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §137; C. 1943, 45 Am. Jur. 2d 669, Intoxicating Liq-
46-0-179. uors § 265. 
Collateral References. Eevocation or suspension of liquor li-
Intoxicating Liquors<§=>161. cense because of drinking or drunkenness 
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 258. on part of licensee or business associates, 
36 A. L. R. 3d 1301. 
32-7-25. Having liquor without permit.—Except as authorized by this 
act, no person, not holding a permit under this act entitling him so to do, 
shall have any liquor in his possession within this state. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §138; C. 1943, 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors §192. 
16-0-18O. 45 Am. Jur. 2d 645, Intoxicating Liq-
uors § 230. 
Collateral References. 
Intoxicating Liquors€=>lll. 
32-7-26. Advertising prohibited.—The advertising of alcoholic bever-
ages by the commission and any window display thereof in its stores are 
hereby expressly prohibited, except that the commission may provide for 
appropriate signs on window or front of building denoting the fact that 
it is a state liquor store or package agency, and may provide for printed 
price lists. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §139; 0. 1943, erages. Horman v. Liquor Control Comm., 
164-181. 21 U. (2d) 294, 445 P. 2d i 
-Alcoholic beverages" defined. Collateral References. 
Light beer is included within phrase Intoxicating Liquors<§=»lli. 
Hlcoholie beverages." Bird & Jcx Co. v. 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 192. 
fank, 96 IT. 450, 85 P. 2d 831. 45 Am. Jur. 2d (549, Intoxicating Liq-
uors 8 236. 
yght beer advertising. 
Commission regulation providing that Validity, construction, ind effect of 
jght beer might be advertised is valid statutes, ordinances or regulations pro-
j view of 32-7-27 notwithstanding con- hibiting or regulating advertising of in-
tention that 32-7-26 is general prohibi- toxicating liquors, 19 A. L. |B. 2d 1114. 
•ion against advertising all alcoholic bev-
32-7-27. Advertising prohibition applicable to manufacturers, licensees 
ind package agencies.—The prohibition against advertising alcoholic bev-
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32-9-12. Penalty for violation of act. Unless otherwise provided herein, every 
person who violates this act is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 32-9-11, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1979, ch. 112, §2. Although it was enacted as*32-9-11, the 
compiler has redesignated this section as 
32-9-12 since Laws 1977, ch. 137, £1 had 
already enacted a 32-9-11. 
CHAPTER 11 
DRAM SHOP ACT 
Section 
32-11-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale or other distribution of intoxicating 
liquors — Injured person's cause of action against intoxicated person or person 
who provided liquor — Survival of action 
32-11-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and employees, and political subdivisions 
32-11-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale or other distribu-
tion of intoxicating liquors — Injured person's cause of action against intoxi-
cated person or person who.provided liquor — Survival of action. (1) Any 
person who gives, sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating liquor to another con-
trary to subsection 16-6-13.1 (8)(d), subsection 32-1-36.5 (1)(1), section 32-7-14 or 
subsection 32-7-24 (b) or (c), and thereby causes the intoxication of the other per-
son, is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third 
person, or the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the 
intoxication. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to in subsection (1) of this section, 
shall have a cause of action against the intoxicated person and the person who 
provided the intoxicating liquor in violation of subsection (1) above, or either of 
them. 
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this section dies, the rights 
or liabilities provided by this section shall survive to or against that person's 
estate. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 152, § 1. viding immunity for the state, its agencies, 
emplovees, and political subdivisions. Title of Act.
 L a w s 1981> c h 152> 
An act relating to intoxicating liquors; pro-
viding liability for injuries resulting from ^ a w Reviews. 
illegal sale or other distribution of mtoxicat- A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered 
ing liquors; providing that claims and liabili- the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 
ties survive the death of a person; and pro- Utah L. Rev. 495. 
32-11-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and employees, and political sub-
divisions. No provision of this act shall create any civil liability on the part of 
the state, its agencies, employees, or political subdivisions, arising out of their 
activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in, the 
sale or other distribution of intoxicating liquor. 
History: L. 1981, ch 152, § 2. 
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(5) A petition pending in the Supreme Court shall 
not o f itself stay or suspend the operation o f any 
order o f the commission, although the Supreme 
Court in its discretion may enter an order staying or 
suspending in whole or in part the operation o f the 
commission's order during pendency. The Supreme 
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after hearing, make a written finding that great or 
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finding shall be based upon evidence submitted to 
the court and identified by reference. vm 
32A-1-21. Citizens' council created - Members • 
Vacancies - Quorum • Per diem allowance and 
expenses - Meetings - Clerical staff - Attorney 
general. 
A Citizens' Council on Alcoholic Beverage 
Control is created which consists of seven persons 
who are citizens of the United States and the state 
of Utah. The governor shall appoint three members, 
two of whom hold office for a period of four years 
and one of whom holds office for a period of two 
yean. The speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the president of the Senate shall each appoint 
two members, one to a two year term and one to a 
four-year term. Vacancies occurring for any reason 
are filled for the unexpired term, or for four years 
if due to expiration of a term, by the person then 
occupying the office responsible for the appointme-
nt. Four members of the council constitute a 
quorum for the transaction of business. The 
members appointed select one of their number as 
chairman to serve at the pleasure of the council. 
(a) Each council member receives a per diem 
allowance as set by the Division o f Finance for each 
day or partial day in which the member is engaged 
in performing council business, together with all 
actual and necessary expenses incurred in carrying 
out official duties. 
(b) The council holds meetings at times and 
places as may be called by the chairman or any two 
members. Meetings may be open to the public. 
Necessary facilities to accommodate the needs o f the 
members are provided by the lieutenant governor. 
4 c ) The council may hire clerical staff as it 
considers necessary for the efficient transaction o f 
its business. The attorney general shall render legal 
assistance as requested by the council. 
• (d) N o more than four o f the members shall be 
of the same political party. isas 
32A-1-22. Citizens' council - Powers and duties. 
The council is independently empowered and its 
principal duty is to consider, investigate, and 
inquire into any or all matters within the scope o f 
or directly related to this title and matters 
concerned directly or indirectly with the administra-
tion and enforcement o f laws related t o the sale, 
purchase, and consumption o f alcoholic beverages. 
It shall not interfere in the direction or management 
of the state alcoholic products operation. The 
council shall prepare an annual report to the 
governor and the Legislature setting forth, in detail, 
its activities o f the previous year. The council may 
make recommendations concerning the same t o the 
governor, the Legislature, and the commiss ion, 
setting forth, in detail, its activities o f the previous 
year. The council may make recommendations con* 
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cerning the same to the governor, the Legislature, 
the commission, the director, the department, the 
commissioner of public safety or to any other 
person, commission, or agency as it considers advi-
sable. The commission is required to meet with the 
council at least semiannually and more frequently if 
requested by the commission or the council. The 
Bureau o f Narcotics and Alcoholic Beverage Law 
Enforcement of the Department o f Public Safety 
shall cooperate with the council in all matters conc-
erning this title. 1993 
32A-1-23. Citizens' council - Power to obtain inf-
ormation. 
The council is authorized to secure directly from 
the commission, its members, the director, and de-
partment employees information concerning the 
alcoholic product operations of the state; and the 
commission, its members, the director, and depart-
ment employees are authorized and directed to 
furnish information directly to the council upon 
request. tns 
32A-1-24. Citizens' council • Hearings - Reports. 
(1) The council may conduct private and public 
hearings and compel the appearance o f witnesses by 
subpoena. The council is not required to make its 
findings public, but shall report fully to the 
governor and the legislative council o f the Utah 
State Legislature. 
(2) Any council member w h o is not satisfied with 
council reports or recommendations may Hie addit-
ional reports and recommendations to the governor 
and the legislative council of the Utah State Legisl-
ature. 1W3 
32A-1-25. Citizens' council - May request grand 
Jury. 
When the council believes the public interest 
demands it, the council by majority vote may 
request any district judge to summon a grand jury 
for the purpose of inquiring into actual or suspected 
public offenses against this title and concerned 
directly or indirectly with the administration and 
enforcement of laws related t o the sale, purchase, 
and consumption of alcoholic beverages. ins 
Chapter 2. State Stores 
32A-2-1. CommtaioB's power to establish state stores -
Limitations. 
32A-2-2. State store • Coounissioa tad department duties 
before estabttsaiat. 
32A-2-3. OperadoaaJ restrictioas. 
32A-2-4. Delivery of Uqoor to state stont. 
32A-2-1. Commission's power to establish state 
stores - l imitat ions . 
(1) The commission may establish state operated 
liquor stores known as 'state stores* in numbers 
and at places, owned or leased by the department, 
as it considers proper for the sale of liquor, by 
employees o f the state, in accordance with this title 
and the rules made under this title. Employees o f 
state stores are considered employees o f the depart-
ment and shall meet all qualification requirements 
for employment outlined in Section 32A-1-11. 
(2) The power o f the commission to establish 
state stores is plenary, except as otherwise provided 
by this title, and is not subject to review. 
(3) The total number o f state stores shall not at 
any time aggregate more than that number determi-
ned by dividing the population o f the state by 
48,000. Population is determined by the most recent 
United States dece 
other population d 
States or state gov 
ion does not appb 
liquor licenses, or 
are governed by 
provided elsewhere 
(4) N o state stoi 
feet of any public 
library, public play 
the method in Sub 
be established wit 
private school , chu 
round, or park me; 
nearest entrance c 
nearest property be 
school, church, pu 
or park. These pre 
one of the following 
(a) The comnr 
ion that the premise 
third class or a t 
distance requiremer 
exceptional practice 
undue hardships i; 
store. In that eve 
giving full consider; 
umstances, followm 
town, and where p t 
ncerned, authorize 
requirements to reli 
if the variance ma> 
detriment to the pu 
ally impairing the int 
(b) With respec 
store in any locati 
giving full considers 
umstances, followin 
and where practical 
reduce the proximit 
church if the local ] 
question gives its wri 
(5) With respect 
church, public libra 
the 600 foot limitati 
entrance o f the oi 
route of either ordi 
applicable, vehicula 
ares, whichever is 
boundary of the pi 
public library, publ 
nd, or park. 
(6) Nothing in th 
ion from considerir 
onal, religious, an 
other relevant fact* 
proposed location, 
educational facility 
infant day care cc 
schools. 
32A-2-2. State store 
duties before establi 
(1) Before a state 
commission, the de 
tigation and hold p 
gathering informati 
to the commission 
state store to ass 
general population 
shall be forwarded 
determination. 
CODEKX) For ANNOTATIONS, the latest UTAH ADVANCE 
rnwnouc leverages 32A-14-1 
*yance is occupied or used in violation of this title 
ft commission rules as described in this section, or 
illows the same to be so occupied or used, the same 
s subject to a lien for and may be sold to pay all 
foes and costs assessed against the person guilty of 
be nuisance and the lien may be enforced by action 
A any court having jurisdiction. 
(3) Any action to abate any nuisance defined in 
[his title is brought in the name of the Department 
j( Alcoholic Beverage Control in any court having 
jurisdiction. It is tried as an action in equity. N o 
ixjfld is required to initiate proceedings. 
(4) The court may issue a temporary writ of inju-
action, if it appears that the nuisance exists, retra-
cing the defendant from conducting or permitting 
the continuance of the nuisance until the conclusion 
of the trial. The court may also issue an order rest-
raining the defendant and all other persons from 
(tnoving or interfering with the alcoholic products, 
packages, equipment, or other property kept or 
ssed in violation of this title or commission rules. 
(5) In any action to abate or enjoin any nuisance, 
I is not necessary for the court to find the property 
0olved was being unlawfully used at the time of 
&e bearing, but on finding that the material allega-
aoos of the petition or complaint are true, the court 
iiall order that no alcoholic product shall be posse-
*td, kept, used, offered for sale, sold, given, furn-
shed, supplied, received, purchased, stored, wareh-
oused, manufactured, adulterated, shipped, carried, 
^imported, or distributed in the room, house, 
smlding, structure, place, aircraft, vehicle, vessel, 
* other conveyance or in any part of these. Upon 
pigment of the court ordering abatement of the 
sgisance, the court may order that the premises or 
joQveyance in question shall not be occupied or 
ssed for any purpose for one year. The court may 
permit the premises or conveyance to be occupied 
j used if its owner, lessee, tenant, or occupant 
pves bond in an appropriate amount with sufficient 
jirety, approved by the court, payable to the state 
i Utah, and on the conditions that alcoholic 
inducts will not be present therein or thereon, and 
£it payment of all fines, costs, and damages that 
jay be assessed for any violation of this title or 
^omission rules upon the property will be made. 
(6) If a tenant of any premises uses the same or 
ff part thereof in maintaining a common nuisance 
I defined in this section, or knowingly permits use 
Uj another, the lease is rendered void, and the right 
>9 possession reverts to the owner or lessor who is 
[sailed to the remedy provided by law for forcible 
Leauon of the premises. 
(7) Any person who knowingly permits any 
tatting or premises owned or leased by the person, 
bunder the person's control, or any part of any 
fakUng or premises, to be used in maintaining a 
l^wnon nuisance as defined in this title, or who, 
Ler being notified in writing by a prosecuting 
Hfrer or any citizen of the unlawful use, and who 
[gs to take all proper measures, either to abate the 
Lance or to remove the person or persons from 
U premises, is guilty of assisting in the maintaining 
If t&e nuisance, ifts 
t\.13-7. Right of appeal in state. 
| ia ail cases arising under this title the commission 
L tbc state has the right of appeal as to questions 
pis*. m$ 
£$•134. Duties of officials and officers to 
pure* this act. 
|Ji) It is the duty of the governor, the commissio-
ners, the director and all officials, inspectors, and 
employees of the department, all prosecuting 
officials of the state and its political sul 
and of counties, cities, and towns, .3 
officers, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, co 
marshals, law enforcement officials, stal 
officials, and all clerks of the courts to < 
enforce this title in their respective ci 
Failure to do so is a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) Immediately upon conviction of an] 
for violation of this title or commission rule 
violation of any city or town ordinance rd 
alcoholic products, it is the duty of the cleir 
court to notify the Department of A 
Beverage Control of the conviction in wn 
forms supplied by the department. 
32A-13-9. Authority of inspectors, peace off! 
inspect. 
(1) For purposes of enforcing this title and com-
mission rules, all members of the commission, 
citizens' council, authorized representatives of the 
commission or department or any law enforcement 
or peace officer shall be accorded access, ingress, 
and egress to and from all premises or conveyances 
used in the manufacture, storage, transportation, 
service, or sale of any alcoholic product. They also 
have the authority to open any package containing, 
or supposed to contain, any article manufactured, 
sold, or exposed for sale, or held in possession with 
intent to sell in violation of this title or commission 
rules, and may inspect its contents, and may take 
samples of the contents for analysis. 
(2) All dealers, clerks, bookkeepers, express 
agents, railroad and airline officials, common and 
other carriers, and their employees shall assist, when 
so requested by any authorized person specified in 
Subsection (1), in tracing, finding, or discovering 
the presence of any article prohibited by this title or 
commission rules to the extent assistance would not 
infringe upon the person's federal and state constit-
utional rights. lfts 
Chapter 14. Dram Shop Liability 
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale 
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages • Injured 
person's cause of action against intoxicated person or 
persons who provided alcoholic beverage - Survival of 
action. 
32A-14-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and employe* 
es, and political subdivision*. 
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from 
illegal sale or other distribution of alcoholk 
beverages - Injured person's cause of action against 
intoxicated person or persons who provided 
alcoholic beverage • Survival of action. 
(1) Any person who gives, sells, or otherwise 
provides liquor to another contrary to this title and 
by those actions causes the intoxication of the other 
person, is liable for injuries in person, property* or 
means of support to any third person, oir the 
spouse, child, or parent of that third person, 
resulting from the intoxication. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsec-
tion (1) has a cause of action against the intoxicated 
person and the person who provided the liquor in 
violation of Subsection (1), or either of them. 
(3) |f a person having rights or liabilities under 
this section dies, the rights or liabilities provided by 
this section survive to or against that person's 
estate. ins 
§3£«CO 
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32A-14-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and 
employees, and political subdivisions. 
No provision of this title creates any civil liability 
on the part of the state, its agencies, employees, the 
commission, the department, or any state political 
subdivisions arising out of their activities in regula-
ting, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being 
involved in the sale or other distribution of 
alcoholic beverages. IMS 
Chapter 15. Bureau of Narcotics and 
Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement 
32A-15-L Creatioa of Bureau of Narcotics aad Alcohofic 
Beverage Law Enforcemeat. 
32A-15-2. Rttpoasibility aad jarisdictioa. 
32A-1S-3. Appoiatmeat of director. 
32A-15-4. Power* aad daties of director. 
32A-15-5. SoppUes aad eqaipneat. 
32A-15-6. Director aad officers to hare powers of peace 
officers. 
32A-15-7. Bureau to cooperate wita other ageades. 
32A-15-S. Other ageades to cooperate with boreao. 
32A-15-1. Creation of Boreao of Narcotics and 
Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement. 
There is created within the Department of Public 
Safety a bureau known as the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement. ists 
32A-15-2. Responsibility and jurisdiction. 
The bureau shall: 
(1) have specific responsibility for the enforcem-
ent of all laws of the state pertaining to alcoholic 
beverages and products; 
(2) have general law enforcement jurisdiction thr-
oughout the state; 
(3) have concurrent law enforcement jurisdiction 
with all local law enforcement agencies and their 
officers. The bureau does not relieve local law enf-
orcement agencies or officers of the responsibility of 
enforcing laws relating to alcoholic beverages and 
products or any other laws; 
(4) sponsor or supervise programs or projects 
related to prevention, detection, and control of vio-
lations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and 
Utah Controlled Substance Act; 
(5) respond to the call of the governor for 
emergency or other purposes as the governor may 
require. IMS 
32A-15-3. Appointment of director. 
(1) The Commissioner of Public Safety shall 
appoint a director who serves at the pleasure of the 
commissioner, and who supervises and directs the 
activities of the bureau. 
(2) The director shall be a full time officer of the 
state, who in addition to possessing administrative 
ability, is experienced in law enforcement and has a 
background of training related to narcotics and 
alcoholic beverages and products. 
(3) The salary of the director is fixed by the Leg-
islature in accordance with Section 67-8-3. The 
director shall also be paid all necessary expenses 
incurred while engaged in the performance of 
official duties. isas 
32A-15-4. Powers and dalles of director. 
The director, with the consent of the Commissio-
ner of Public Safety, shall: 
(1) Appoint enforcement agents, investigative 
agents, clerks, and other employees as authorized 
from eligible lists supplied by the state merit system. 
Not fewer than 21 enforcement and investigative 
agents shall be appointed. This provision shall not 
prohibit the director from employing or paying for 
the assistance of persons on a temporary basis who 
may otherwise be ineligible for state employment 
for purposes of assisting in crime prevention or de-
tection; 
(2) Delegate responsibilities among employees as 
necessary for the purpose of policing and enforcing 
the laws of this state with respect to alcoholic beve-
rages, products, dangerous drugs, and narcotics; 
(3) Establish ranks, grades, and positions in the 
bureau and designate the authority and responsibil-
ity in each rank, grade, and position; 
(4) Establish standards and qualifications and fix 
prerequisites of training, education, and experience 
for each rank, grade, and position, and fix salaries 
for each rank, grade, and position in accordance 
with salary standards adopted by the Division of 
Finance; 
(5) Appoint, under Subsection (1), personnel to 
each rank, grade, and position as necessary for the 
efficient operation and administration of the bureau 
and devise and administer examinations designed to 
test applicants for the positions. Any persons hired 
shall meet prescribed standards and prerequisites; 
(6) Formulate any necessary rules governing the 
bureau; 
(7) Discharge, demote, temporarily suspend, or 
take other disciplinary action against any employes 
in accordance with the State Personnel Management 
Act, Chapter 19, Title 67; 
(8) Prescribe any uniforms worn and equipment 
used by the employees; H 
(9) Establish with the approval of the Division of 
Finance, the terms and conditions under which eny*j 
expense allowance is paid to any employee; J 
(10) Conduct in conjunction with the state boaira 
of education and higher education in state school*,*! 
colleges, and universities, an educational progrta] 
concerning alcoholic products, and work in conju&J 
ction with civic organizations, churches, local unM 
of government, and other organizations in the praJ 
vention of alcoholic product and drug violations; • 4 
(11) Coordinate law enforcement programs thmJ 
ughout the state and accumulate and dissemissiJ 
information related to the prevention, detecnoji 
and control of violations of this title as it relates | 3 
storage or consumption of alcoholic beverages j | 
premises maintained by social dubs, 
athletic, and kindred associations; 
(12) Prepare and present evidence in 
with prosecution of persons charged with 
offenses, and assist local law enforcement 
in controlling law violations; 
(13) Cooperate with any law enforcement 
for the purpose of coordinating and 
records concerning prevention, detection, 
control of violations of the law; 
(14) Make inspections and investigations 
required by the Alcoholic Beverage Control 
ission and Department; 
(15) Consult and cooperate with the 
Council on Alcoholic Beverage Control; 
(16) Perform other acts as may be necessary 
appropriate concerning control,of the use 
alcoholic beverages and products and drugs; 
(17) Make reports to the Legislature, 
governor, the Commissioner of Public Safety, 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission and 
rtment, and the Citizens' Council as msy 
required or requested; 
; (18) Make recommendations to the 
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so requested by any authorized person specified in Subsection (1), in trac-
ing, finding, or discovering the presence of any article prohibited by this 
title or commission rules to the extent assistance would not infringe upon 
the person's federal and state constitutional rights. 
History: C. 1953,32A-13-9, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1. 
CHAPTER 14 
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY 
Section Section 
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting Person or persons who pro-
from illegal sale or other die- llded. a}corholi? beverage — 
tribution of alcoholic bever-
 OOA 1/4 0 T Survival of action 
ages - Inured person's cause 32A-14-2. ^ * £ ^ * £ J j — 
of action against intoxicated subdivisions 
32A-14-L Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale 
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages — 
Injured person's cause of action against intoxi-
cated person or persons who provided alco-
holic beverage — Survival of action. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or 
at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, 
to a person: 
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or 
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs or 
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or 
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or 
(d) who is a known interdicted person, 
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for 
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to 
the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxica-
tion. An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of 
this chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic bever-
age in violation of Subsection (1). 
781 
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(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under thi^ chapter dies, the 
rights or liabilities provided by this chapter survive Ito or against that 
person's estate. 
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person 
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter wh^ch arises after the 
effective date of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate 
amount which may be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one 
occurrence is limited to $300,000. 
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which 
arises after the effective date of this subsection shall b^ commenced within 
two years after the date of the injury. 
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of (action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the injury. 
History: C. 1953,32A-14-1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective March 17, 1986, added the 
language in Subsection (1) following "or oth-
erwise provides liquor," Subsections (l)(a) 
through (l)(d), the last sentence in Subsec-
tion (1), and Subsections (4) through (6); in-
serted "directly" in Subsection (1) near the 
Utah Law Review. — A New Perspective 
— Has Utah Entered the Twentieth Century 
in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 495. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicat-
ing Liquors § 292. 
C.J.S. — 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors 
§ 34; 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors 
§§ 428-463. 
A.L.R. — Civil damage or dramshop act: 
what constitutes injury to means of support 
within civil damage or dramshop act, 4 
A.L.R.3d 1332. 
Liability, under dramshop acts, of one who 
sells or furnishes liquor otherwise than in op-
eration of regularly established liquor busi-
ness, 8 A.L.R.3d 1412. 
Who is, as "owner" of premises on which 
intoxicating liquor is sold, liable under civil 
damage or dramshop act, 18 A.L.R.3d 1323. 
Criminal liability for death resulting from 
unlawfully furnishing intoxicating liquor or 
drugs to another, 32 A.L.R.3d 589. 
beginning; in Subjection (2), inserted "or 
other alcoholic beverage"; and made minor 
stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — The phrase "effec-
tive date of this subsection," referred to in 
Subsections (4) ahd (5), appears in Laws 
1986, ch. 177, § ^, which became effective 
March 17,1986. 
Common-law r^ght of action for damage 
sustained by plaiitiff in consequence of sale 
or gift of intoxicating liquor or habit-forming 
drug to another, 97 A.L.R.3d 528. 
Criminal liability of member or agent of 
private club or association, or of owner or les-
sor of its premises, for violation of state or 
local liquor or gambling laws thereon, 98 
A.L.R.3d 694. 
Liability of persons furnishing intoxicating 
liquor for injury to or death of consumer, out-
side coverage of civil damage acts, 98 
A.L.R.3d 1230. 
Choice of law £s to liability of liquor seller 
for injuries caused by intoxicated person, 2 
A.L.R.4th 952. 
Tavernkeeper*s liability to patron for third 
person's assault, 43 A.L.R.4th 281. 
Key Numbers. — Intoxicating Liquors «=» 
282, 283. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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32A-14-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and em-
ployees, and political subdivisions. 
No provision of this title creates any civil liability on the part of the 
state, its agencies, employees, the commission, the department, or any state 
political subdivisions arising out of their activities in regulating, control-
ling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in the sale or other distribu-
tion of alcoholic beverages. 
History: C. 1953,32A-14-2, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability of state or municipality operated liquor store or establishment, 95 
in tort action for damages arising out of sale A.L.R.3d 1243 
of intoxicating liquor by state or municipally 
CHAPTER 15 
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Section Section 
32A-15-1. Creation of Bureau of Narcotics 32A-15-5. Supplies and equipment. 
and Alcoholic Beverage Law 32A-15-6. Director and officers to have 
Enforcement powers of peace officers. 
32A-15-2. Responsibility and jurisdiction. 32A-15-7. Bureau ^cooperate with other 
32A-15-3. Appointment of director. 32A-15-8. Othe/agencies to cooperate with 
32A-15-4. Powers and duties of director. bureau. 
32A-15-1. Creation of Bureau of Narcotics and Alcoholic 
Beverage Law Enforcement. 
There is created within the Department of Public Safety a bureau known 
as the Bureau of Narcotics and Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement. 
History: C. 1953,32 A-15-1, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Department of pub-
1985, ch. 175, § 1. he safety, § 41-13-1 et seq. 
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indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured 
person not to be bound by the settlement agreement, liability release, or 
disavowed statement. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4. 
78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or 
statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.—The rights 
provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in lieu of, 
any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise existing 
in the law. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5. 
78-27-37. Comparative negligence—Diminishment of damages—"Con-
tributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."—Contributory neg-
ligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal repre-
sentative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in 
death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great 
as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery 
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion 
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used 
in this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk." 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 1. releases on other joint tort-feasors.—L. 
Title of Act. ' 
An act relating to actions for the re- Cross-Reference. 
covery of damages in actions based on Product Liability Act, manufacturer or 
negligence or gross negligence; removing seller not liable if alteration or modifica-
contributory negligence as a bar to any tion of product after sale is substantial 
recovery under certain circumstances; pro- contributing cause of injury, 78-15-5. 
viding for the diminishing of any recovery 
in proportion to the negligence of the Law Reviews. 
person seeking recovery; providing for Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & 
separate judgments as to damages and Light Co.—Jury Blindfolding in Compara-
proportionate negligence; providing for tive Negligence Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 
contribution among joint tort-feasors; pro- 569. 
viding for ^the release of one or more Note, A Primer on Damages under the 
joint tort-feasors without releasing them Utah Wrongful Death and Survival Stat-
all; and providing for the effect of such utes, 1974 Utah L. Kev. 519. 
78-27-38. Separate special verdicts on damages and percentage of negli-
gence—Reduction of damages.—The court may, and when requested by 
any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining 
(1) the total amount of damages suffered and (2) the percentage of negli-
gence attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount 
of the damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person seeking recovery. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, §2 . 
78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-feasors—Discharge of common 
liability by joint tort-feasor required.—(1) The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled 
348 
CONSTRUCTION 68-3-11 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Sundays and on Sunday or holiday, validity of, 63 A.L.R.3d 
Holiday § 70 et seq. 423. 
C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Holidays §§ 4 to 6. Key Numbers. — Holidays «=» 4 to 6. 
A.L.R. — Service of summons or complaint 
68-3-9- Seal, how affixed. 
When the seal of a court or public officer is required by law to be affixed to 
any paper, the word "seal" includes an impression of such seal upon the paper 
alone, as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the 
word "seal" may include a scroll printed or written. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2495; Great seal of the State of Utah, Utah Const., 
C.L. 1917, § 5845; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, Art. VII, Sec. 20; § 67-la-8. 
88-2-9. Municipal seals, § 10-1-202. 
Cross-References. — Custody of seals by Seals of courts, §§ 78-7-14, 78-7-15. 
archivist, § 63-2 to 62.5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Seals § 3. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Seals § 3. 
Key Numbers. — Seals «=» 3. 
68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority. 
Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers, or other 
persons, are to be construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, 
unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2496; Cross-References. — Personal representa-
C.L. 1917, § 5846; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, tives, majority concurrence required unless 
88-2-10. will provides otherwise, § 75-3-716. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Board of education. ties of a board of education. Tooele Bldg. Ass'n 
Joint authority is not "otherwise expressed" v. Tooele High School Dist. No. 1,43 Utah 362, 
in any statute prescribing the powers and du- 134 P. 894 (1913). 
68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases. 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are 
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appro-
priate meaning or definition. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2497; Cross-References. — Duty of court to con-
C.L. 1917, § 5847; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, strue statutes, § 78-21-3. 
88-2-11. 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-8 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction and application. underpass; this act should lie strictly construed 
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it 
recovery of any property real or personal or for only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah 
the possession thereof does not include an ac- State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah|2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 
tion for damages for impairment of access to (1973). 
property caused by construction of highway 
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op-
eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury result-
ing from the negligent operation by any employee of a motoit vehicle or other 
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that t(his section shall 
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined l^ y law and while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of § 41-6-14. 
History: L, 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch. Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 
129, § 5. 86, Laws of Utah, 1961" at the end of the sec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend- tion. 
ment substituted "during the performance of Cross-References. — [Safety Responsibility 
his duties, within the scope of employment, or Act, provisions of motor vjehicle liability policy, 
under color of authority" for "while in the § 41-12-21. 
scope of his employment"; and deleted "Utah 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waited for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of ajiy highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge^ viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Construction. 
Contributory negligence. 
Dangerous objects. 
Discretionary function. 
Ice and snow on sidewalk. 
Manholes. 
Negligent construction. 
New duties not created. 
Nondelegable duty. 
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-42 
to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged 
the common liability or more than his prorata share thereof. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 3. ApplicabiUty. 
Compiler's Notes. Because this section creates a new cause of action in a tort-feasor who has paid 
Section 3 of Laws 1973, ch. 209 con-
 m o r e t h a n h j g pr0rata share of a common 
tamed no subsec. (2). liability, it is not merely remedial and 
Cross-References. d o e s n o t *?& ^ h f e t}?? underlying tort 
was committed before its effective date, 
Enforcement of contribution and reim-
 e v e n though liability was not adjudged bursement, Rules of Civil Procedure, Bule
 u n t i l a f t e r t h a t date% Brunyer v. Salt 
6 9 i h } ' .-,. . „ , Lake County, 551 P. 2d 521. 
Joint obligations, 15-4-1 et seq. 
78-27-40. Settlement by joint tort-feasor—Determination of relative de-
grees of fault of joint tort-feasors—"Joint tort-feasor" defined.—(1) A 
joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person shall 
not be entitled to recover contribution from another joint tort-feasor whose 
liability to the injured person is not extinguished by that settlement. 
(2) When there is a disproportion of fault among joint tort-feasors to 
an extent that it would render inequitable an equal distribution by contribu-
tion among them of their common liability, the relative degrees of fault of 
the joint tort-feasors shall be considered in determining their prorata 
shares, solely for the purpose of determining their rights of contribution 
among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured person for 
the whole injury as at common law. 
(3) As used in this section, "joint tort-feasor" means one of two or 
more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to 
person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against 
all or some of them. 
History: L. 1973, eh. 209, § 4. 
78-27-41. Individual liability of joint tort-feasors, right of indemnity 
under law, and contractual right to contribution or indemnity not affected. 
—Nothing in this act shall affect: 
(1) The common-law liability of the several joint tort-feasors to have 
judgment recovered, and payment made, from them individually by the 
injured person for the whole injury. However, the recovery of a judgment 
by the injured person against one joint tort-feasor does not discharge the 
other joint tort-feasors. 
(2) Any right of indemnity which may exist under present law. 
(3) Any right to contribution or indemnity arising from contract or 
agreement. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 5. 
78-27-42. Release of joint tort-feasor—Reduction of injured person's 
claim.—A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether 
before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors, unless 
the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors 
by the greater of: (1) The amount of the consideration paid for that re-
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MARJORIE ALLISEN, 
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AMERICAN LEGION POST NO. 
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JERRY D. FENN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY D. FENN 
Civil No. 38319 
1. In 1985 I was the Chairman of the Citizens1 Council 
on Alcoholic Beverage Control, a seven member, bi-partisan 
council created by statutes of the State of Utah and independently 
empowered to consider, investigate and inquire into all matters 
related to the liquor laws of the state. See §32A-l-32 Utah Code 
Ann. (1985). 
2. The scope of the Citizens1 Council's responsibilities 
encompasses serving in an advisory capacity to the Utah Legis-
lature regarding possible amendments to the liquor laws. In the 
sximmer of 1985, the Business, Labor & Economic Development Interim 
Committee of the Legislature referred several proposed liquor law 
amendments to the Citizens' Council. 
3. On November 20, 1985, the Citizens' Council submitted 
its report and recommendation to this committee of the Utah 
Legislature. A true and accurate copy of the Report and Recommen-
dation is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
4. The Report and Recommendation proposed certain amend-
ments to the then existing Utah Dram Shop Act. Because the Dram 
Shop Act that then existed created liability only for those giving, 
selling or otherwise providing "Liquor", one of the proposed 
amendments, found at pages 8 and 9 of the Report, was to expand 
the scope of the statute to encompass "beer". 
5. After the Report and Recommendation was submitted to 
the Legislature, I was asked by the Chairperson of the Interim 
Committee to draft the proposed revisions to the Utah Dram Shop 
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Act. Among other things, the proposed amendments as originally 
drafted would have expanded the scope of the pram Shop Act to 
any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides 
"alcoholic beverages," which would have included both liquor 
and beer. The proposed amendment incorporated the revisions 
recommended by the Citizens' Council. 
6. The amendments as originally drafted did not pass. 
This was due in part I believe to lobbying efforts on the part 
of the Utah Grocers' Association and others who vigorously opposed 
any expansion of statutory liability to those who sold alcoholic 
beverages for off-premise consumption. The Act as passed provides 
only for liability for any person who directly "gives, sells, or 
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing consumption 
on the premises, any alcoholic beverage . . . " The reason for this 
amendment was to exclude from the scope of the dram shop statute 
liability grocery stores, convenience stores and other establish-
ments which sell beer but do not allow consumption on premises. 
In other words, despite the Report and Recommendation of the 
Citizens' Council to the Utah Legislature to expand the scope of 
the Dram Shop Statute to include all alcoholic beverages, both 
liquor and beer, the Legislature specifically rejected the recommen-
dation to the extent that the Utah Dram Shop Act, in its present 
form, does not apply to the sale of beer at locations that do not 
allow consumption on the premises. 
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Fur ther a f f i a n t sayeth n o t . 
DATED t h i s t > ' day of September, 1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o beforevme t h i s ^ y ^ a a y of September, 
1987. 
NOTARY P U B L I C / 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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MPOBT AND ISCOlimaroATION OF 
TIE CITIZENS' CPWCIL OK ALC0BQUC BBVEKACE CQNTKOl 
TO TIE PTAB IBqiSUTVKE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Citizens' Council on Alcoholic Beverage Control (the"Citizens' 
Council"), a seven member, bi-partisan council created by statutes of the 
State of Utah, is independently empowered to consider, investigate and 
inquire into all matters related to the liquor lavs of the state. §& S32A-1-
22 Utah Code Ann. (1985). The scope of the Citizens' Council's responsibilities 
encompasses serving in an advisory capacity to the Legislature regarding 
possible amendments to the state's liquor lavs. 
During the summer of 1985, the Business, Labor and Economic 
Development Interim Committee of the Legislature referred several 
proposed amendments to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (the "Act") to 
the Citizens' Council for comment The Citizens' Council held three public 
hearings in September and October, 1985 to obuin comment about these and 
other proposed amendments. 
Although the Citizens' Council heard comments from numerous people, 
it should be pointed out that most of those who addressed the Council were 
representatives of the travel and tourism or hospitality industries. Very few 
citizens vho were not directly involved with alcoholic beverages appeared 
before the Council The comments which the Citizens' Council heard from 
special interest groups may not in fact be representative of the sentiments of 
a majority of the citizens of the state. The Citizens' Council believes that 
more public comment should be elicited in an effort to more clearly ascertain 
public opinion with regard to two of the proposed amendments. 
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Ambivalence about alcohol characterized the attitude of many who 
testified before the Citizens' Council. On the one hand, the Citizens' Council 
heard almost unanimous condemnation of the abuse of alcohoL On the other 
hand, the Council heard a substantial number of comments that Utah's 
liquor laws are too tough and need to be more accommodating to tourists 
and those who wish to drink. The Council hearings produced an interesting 
dichotomy: condemnation of the evils of alcohol while at the same time a 
chorus of voices crying out for liberalization of the law. 
The statutory policy of the state with respect to alcoholic beverages is 
to neither promote nor encourage their sale or consumption but to "regulate 
the sale of alcoholic beverages in a manner and at prices which reasonably 
satisfy the public demand and protect the public interest, including the 
rights of citizens who do not wish to be involved with alcoholic products." 
f 32A-1 -4(3) Utah & & AM. (1985). Of course, this is no easy task. It 
represents a difficult balancing of differing interests. 
In formulating recommendations on proposed amendments, the 
Gtizens' Council has attempted to balance the public demand for alcoholic 
beverages with protecting the public interest. The Council has subscribed to 
a philisophical approach that any proposed change in the Act that leads to 
increased abuse of alcohol should be defeated. Alcohol is the number one 
drug of abuse in our society. Highway accidents, death, sickness, social 
disruption, and economic loss result from excess alcohol consumption. In 
reaching a recommendation on any proposed amendment, the Gtizens' 
Council has examined whether the amendment may lead to an increase in 
the consumption of alcohol. If it appears that alcohol consumption will not 
increase as a result of the amendment, the Council has inquired whether the 
current statutory provision adequately meets public demand for alcoholic 
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beverages while protecting the public interest or whether substantial 
reasons for amending the Act exist 
The Qtizens' Council submits the following report and 
recommendation on the proposed amendments and enactments it has 
considered. 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL OPPOSES THE ELIMINATION OP STATE 
CONTROL OYER THE NUMBER OP LIQUOR OUTLETS 
With the repeal of Prohibition (the 18th Amendment) in 1933, Utah 
was one of 18 states to adopt the "state control" concept of dispensing liquor. 
This system vests control of the sale of liquor with the state government 
rather than private enterprise. Utah has the lowest per-capita consumption 
of alcohol of any state. Of course, this is partly attributable to the large non-
drinking population. However, average annual consumption of alcohol in the 
18 control states is approximately 1.63 gallons per capita whereas average 
annual consumption in the 32 other states is 2.10 gallons. An argument can 
be made that state control over the price and availability of alcoholic 
beverages appears to make a difference in consumption of alcohol. The 
Qtizens' Council is of the opinion that it is contary to the public interest to 
see Utah's low rate of alcohol consumption increase. 
The Qtizens' Council believes the state, rather than local 
authorities, is the appropriate entity to regulate the number of outlets where 
liquor may be purchased. Elimination of the statutory quotas in favor of 
local control could lead to an unfettered proliferation in the number of 
outlets. It is possible that some municipalities would completely abandon 
all restraints on the number of liquor outlets. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that some municipalities may totally prohibit outlets within their 
4 
jurisdiction. The Citizens' Council is persuaded that elimination of the 
statutory quotas in favor of local control would be contrary to the public 
interest because of the possible large increase in availability of alcoholic 
beverages and increased alcohol consumption and abuse which could follow. 
In addition, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control and the 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission have demonstrated expertise in 
performing the difficult balancing task required in regulating liquor 
availability through controlling the number of outlets. It is the consensus of 
the Citizens' Council that such expertise not be wasted nor the regulatory 
purview of the Department and the Commission diminished. 
Finally, the 1985 Act, which became effective on July 1,1985. 
provided for an increased rate of growth in the number of liquor outlets. 
The statutory quotas were revised to allow for a slightly greater rate of 
growth for package agencies and restaurant liquor outlets and the statutory 
ceiling on private club outlets was abolished. The new quotas, along with 
improved regulatory control which may result in revocation of unqualified 
and non-complying outlets' licenses, could ameliorate somewhat the scarcity 
of licenses. In the future, the Legislature may deem it advisable to 
examine the liquor license allocation system further. However, the Citizens' 
Council is of the opinion that total elimination of the quotas in favor of local 
regulation of the number of outlets is neither wise nor warranted. 
B. THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL OPPOSES AW TNCTEASS Itt THE HOOTS 
WHEN 1.10TT0K MAT BE SOLD IN RBTAWANTS 
Liquor can be sold in restaurants under the Act from 4:00 p.m. until 
midnight The Utah Restaurant Association has proposed that the hours of 
permissible liquor sales in restaurants be extended to 10:00 i.m. to 1:00 a.m. 
These proposed hours match the liquor sales hours in private clubs. 
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In determining whether to recommend an extension or the hours of 
restaurant liquor sales, the Qtizens' Council considered whether public 
demand for increased hours exists or whether the demands of the liquor-
consuming populace are currently being met at the lunch hour. The Council 
then analyzed whether an increase in liquor sales hour* would have 
beneficial or deleterious impacts on the public interest 
It appears that the demands of those who desire to consume liquor at 
the lunch hour are being met by existing law. The Qtizens' Council has not 
observed a groundsweil of public support for the proposal to extend hours of 
liquor sales in restaurants. While the restaurant industry understandably 
believes the ability to sell liquor at lunch time may attract more customers 
to their establishments, the Council does not think the demonstrated 
demand for liquor during lunch in restaurants is significant enough to justify 
the extension of hours, particularly given the negative impacts discussed 
below. 
The Citizens' Council is persuaded that the advantages which a 
restaurant may gain by being allowed to serve liquor at the lunch hour 
would be offset by the unfavorable aspects to the general public by such a 
change. Increasing the hours of liquor sales in restaurants would increase 
the availability of liquor in public places. Where the needs of those who 
wish to consume liquor at lunch are apparently being met by private clubs, 
the public interest, on balance, appears to weigh in favor of not increasing 
availability. A substantial segment of the population may not wish to be 
exposed to liquor sales at the lunch hour. Moreover, the increase in 
availability of liquor early in the day may lead to more alcohol abuse and 
loss to society. The incidents of on-the-job intoxication may increase, 
bringing the specter of diminished productivity and economic loss. 
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Although the extent of possible negative impacts cannot be accurately 
predicted, the risk of increased alcohol abuse cannot be totally discounted. 
Therefore, given the lack of strong public demand for the extension of liquor 
sales hours, coupled with the potential for abuse occasioned by increased 
availability of liquor, the Gtizens' Council recommends the Legislature not 
amend the law to increase the hours of liquor sales in restaurants from the 
current 4:00 p.m. to midnight. 
f! FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF A PROPOSAL ALLOTING THE 
SERVER TO BRING LIQUOR IN UNOPENED BOTTLES TO THIS 
RESTAURANT PATRON'S TABLE 
Current lav provides that a restaurant patron must make his or her 
liquor purchases at an approved location in the restaurant and then bring 
the mini-bottle back to the table. The Utah Restaurant Association and 
others in the hospitality industry have proposed the Act be amended to 
allow the server to bring the unopened mini-bottle directly to the patrons 
table. 
The Gtizens' Council has concluded that further analysis of this 
proposed amendment is warranted. This proposal should be analyzed in 
conjunction with an in-depth consideration of education and training of 
restaurant servers. In addition, the Council believes further public hearings 
would be helpful in understanding and explaining the ramifications of this 
proposed amendment and in ascertaining public opinion. Opponents of this 
amendment argue that allowing the server to bring liquor to the table may 
result in the restaurant encouraging and promoting liquor sales and that 
allowing untrained servers to bring the liquor to the table may result in the 
loss of control over service of liquor to minors and intoxicated persons. 
Opponents of this amendment also argue that restaurant employees who 
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may not wish to handle liquor will be required by their employer to serve 
liquor. Furthermore, a question has been raised whether the current 
system deters a customer who has consumed his or her first mini-bottle 
from buying a second or third mini-bottle. 
On the other hand, proponents of the amendment have argued that 
the change will promote tourism, further accommodate patrons and alleviate 
the perception of many that Utah's liquor laws are an anomaly. Proponents 
also argue that control over dispensing liquor will actually increase as the 
point of distribution is shifted to the patron's table since this facilitates the 
server's perusal of possible consumers of liquor. 
The Gtizens' Council has also been apprised that adoption of this 
proposal may impact on liquor advertising laws. The ramifications of this 
amendment on liquor advertising laws should be analyzed. The issue of 
"brownbagging" of liquor in restaurants may also be considered in 
conjunction with this proposal. 
Finally, even though this provision of the state's liquor law is 
different from other states, the Gtizens' Council is not convinced, at this 
point, that this is necessarily negative. Although the Council heard 
testimony from representatives of the tourism and hospitality industries 
claiming the majority of citizens find the current law an embarrassment and 
unnecessarily inconvenient to tourists, the Gtizens' Council is of the opinion 
that further analysis is necessary to determine if the purported public 
sentiment to amend the law in fact exists. The existing procedures of liquor 
purchases in restaurants may in fact be a workable system supported by a 
majority of the citizens of the sute. However, it must be pointed out that in 
the three public hearings held by the Council, it did not hear substantial 
opposition to this proposed change. At this point the Council is not sure 
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whether that is because significant public opposition does not exist or 
because the issue has not adequately been brought to the publics attention. 
The Citizens' Council believes a greater effort must be made to elicit public 
comment and ascertain public opinion regarding this proposed amendment 
and the advantages and disadvantages of the amendment weighed further 
during the next year so that a recommendation on this issue can be made 
prior to the 1987 legislative general session. 
D PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAM SHOP STATUTE 
Dram shop statutes and common law liability for dram shops are 
relatively recent developments in the area of tort law. Prior to the 
temperance movement of the early nineteenth century, a tavern owner 
generally could not be liable for any damages caused by a drunic to a third 
party. However, this principle has given way to common law liability in 22 
states and statutory dram shop liability in 23 states, including Utah. Chapter 
14 of the Act, captioned Dram Shop Liability provides in part: 
(1) Any person who gives, sells, or otherwise provides 
liquor to another contrary to this title and by those 
actions causes the intoxication of the other person, is 
liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support 
to any third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of 
that third person, resulting from intoxication. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) 
has a cause of action against the intoxicated person and the 
person who provided the liquor in violation of Subsection (1), 
or either of them. 
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this section 
dies, the rights or liabilities provided by this section survive 
to or against that person's estate. 
S32A-14-1 UlahCfidfe. Aim (1983). 
The dram shop statute (the "Statute") presently creates liability only 
for those giving, selling or otherwise providing "liquor." The Statute does not 
encompass beer. By limiting the Statute to "liquor", only a small percentage 
of those who furnish alcoholic beverages are subjected to liability. 
Intoxication stemming from the consumption of beer is clearly a significant 
issue facing society. The incidents of beer-induced intoxication are not 
minimal. The Council is of the opinion that those who sell give or otherwise 
provide beer to others should not escape the consequences for their actions 
in circumstances where those who furnish liquor would be liable. The 
Gtizens' Council recommends an amendment to the Statute to encompass all 
"alcoholic beverages." (6 voted in favor of this amendment with Mr. 
Thurman opposed). 
The Statute should be further amended to clearly delineate liability 
triggering acts. The Statute currently imposes liability on those who furnish 
liquor "contrary to this title." This rather nebulous phrase should be deleted 
and the particular liability triggering acts inserted. Specifically, at least 
three acts should be inserted in the Statute as acts which trigger liability: 
Selling, giving or otherwise providing alcoholic beverages, unless otherwise 
permitted by law, to (1) minors, S32A-12-8; (2) any person apparently 
under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs, 
S32A-12-9; and (3) any known interdicted person. S32A-12-10 Utah Code 
AM. (1985). 
The Act presently makes it a criminal offense for a person to sell or 
otherwise furnish any alcoholic beverage to a person "actually or apparently 
under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs." 
S32A-12-9 Ulah teds. AM- (1985). The Gtizens' Council believes the 
Legislature should consider deleting the words "actually or" from the statute. 
It has been argued that the current provision imposes a very harsh standard 
for which there is no defense and that instead, a person should be liable 
under the Dram Shop Statute or under the criminal provisions of the Act 
only if the person furnishes alcoholic beverages to an individual who is 
"apparently intoxicated." For example, a private club proprietor will now be 
subject to dram shop or criminal liability if he sells an individual liquor who 
has a blood-alcohol concentration of .OS or higher, even though the 
individual has no outward appearance of intoxication and the person selling 
the beverage has no reason to suspect the individual is intoxicated. 
The Citizens' Council also recommends the Legislature consider 
imposing a ceiling on the amount of damages that can be recovered under 
the Statute. Presently there is no dollar limit on damages recoverable under 
the Statute. The Council heard testimony that many establishments are 
foregoing insurance coverage for dram shop liability because of extremely 
expensive insurance premiums. Insurance companies are reluctant to write 
dram shop insurance due to the unlimited potential liability and the risk of 
numerous judgments. At least four states currently place limits on the 
amount that can be recovered against the person furnishing the alcoholic 
beverage, ranging from $30,000 in Illinois to $500,000 in North Carolina. 
The Gtizens' Council recommends a limitation on the amount of damages that 
may be awarded to any person be incorporated into the Statute with an 
aggregate that may be awarded to all persons as a result of a single 
occurrence. Further input may be needed from the insurance industry and 
others to determine the dollar amount of the limitation. However, the 
Gtizens* Council is persuaded that a limitation of $100,000 that may be 
awarded to any person with an aggregate of $300,000 that may be awarded 
as a result of a single occurrence is an appropriate ceiling. The Council heard 
testimony that such a limitation could have a measurable impact on 
increasing the availability of dram shop insurance to an establishment The 
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Gtizens' Council believes it is in the public interest that commercial vendors 
of alcoholic beverages have dram shop insurance coverage to provide a 
source of payment for injuries to third persons caused by an intoxicated 
person. A limitation on the amount of damages that can be recovered in 
any specific instance may reduce somewhat the reluctance of insurance 
carriers to provide such insurance and could have the tendency to prevent 
premiums for such insurance from continuing to increase at the present 
rapid rates. If a limitation on the amount of damages results in more 
establishments obtaining dram shop insurance, the disadvantages of limiting 
an individual's recovery are offset by the increased likelihood that a fund 
will be available from which the victim can recover. Given the current 
open-ended liability, some victims may obtain judgments but may not be 
able to recover their damages from the establishment if the establishment is 
without insurance. Furthermore, it should be remembered that dram shop 
liability is secondary liability. The victim is not limited by statute in the 
amount of damages he or she can recover from the primary tortfeasor. 
In addition, the Council believes that a specific statute of limitations 
should be provided in the Statute. The Council recommends an amendment 
to the Statute to require that any action under the Statute be brought within 
one year of the date of the occurrence. Often a potentially liable 
establishment may not be apprised of the cause of action until long after the 
injury occurs. The general statute of limitations applicable to personal 
injury cases imposes a hardship on the establishment that served the 
alcoholic beverage since, if a long time has elapsed after the person causing 
the injury was allegedly furnished alcohol, evidentiary problems are 
compounded in finding someone who can testify whether the establishment 
served the person alcoholic beverages and, if so, whether the person 
appeared to be intoxicated. 
The Legislature should consider amending the law to require 
mandatory education and training of all establishment employees who are 
directly involved in selling or otherwise furnishing alcoholic beverages. The 
Qtizens' Council recommends the Legislature consider establishing an 
Alcohol Training and Education Advisory Committee consisting of persons 
representing the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the Citizens' 
Council, the Attorney General the Department of Public Safety, the Division 
of Alcoholism and Drugs, and other appropriate governmental entities as 
well as representatives of alcoholic beverage retailers. The Advisory 
Committee would assist in the formation and implementation of a training 
and education curriculum. An Alcohol Training and Education Seminar 
should be required for all individuals who sell or furnish alcoholic beverages 
to the public in the scope of their employment The following subjects 
should be included in the curriculum and instruction: (1) Alcohol as a drug 
and its effect on the body and behavior, especially driving ability; (2) 
Recognizing the problem drinker; (3) State alcoholic beverage laws including 
operational restrictions; (4) The dram shop law; (5) Drunk driving laws; (6) 
Dealing with the problem customer, including ways to cut off service, ways 
to deal with the belligerent customer and alternative means of 
transportation to get the customer safety home; and (7) Temporary detention 
of the criminal violator of liquor laws until law enforcement officers arrive. 
The Retail Grocers Association informed the Qtizens' Council of two 
amendments they intend to propose: (1) an amendment to provide that a 
merchant may temporarily take an indivdual into custody and detain the 
person if he or she attempts to make an unlawful purchase of an alcoholic 
beverage and (2) an amendment making it a crime for a person actually 
intoxicated or an interdicted person to purchase an alcoholic beverage. The 
Qtizens' Council endorses these amendments vhich will be introduced in the 
1986 general legislative session. The Retail Grocers Association also 
proposes that individuals under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages 
be issued drivers' licenses which clearly indicate the individual is under age 
21. It was suggested that the drivers' licenses of those under the age of 21 
should differ in appearance from licenses of those over age 21, e.g.. perhaps 
by color or by profile photograph rather than a front view photograph. The 
Qtizens' Council believes that contrasting drivers' licenses for those over and 
under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages will assist retailers of 
alcoholic beverages in avoiding sales to those under the age of 21. 
Finally, the Qtizens' Council is of the opinion that the State of Utah 
should not be immune from liability for the sale of alcoholic beverages out 
of a state liquor store to a minor, to an apparently intoxicated person or to a 
known interdicted person. If the Legislature adopts the clarifying and 
limiting amendments to identify the wrongful acts that trigger liability, to 
impose a limitation on the amount of damages that can be recovered and to 
establish a one year statute of limitations, the Council is of the opinion that, 
vith these additional safeguards, the state should not be immune from 
liability under the Statute. Hovever, the Act should clearly indicate that 
immunity is vaived only for sales by the state out of state liquor stores. 
The state should not be liable for sales by a package agency or sales by any 
other licensee or permittee. 
E. FURTHER STUPT OF A PROPOSAL TO ALLOW THE USE P E A 
METERED LIOUOE DISPENSING DEVICE \H P1IVATE CLUBS 
The Licensed Club Association has proposed that the use of mini-
bottles in private clubs be eliminated in favor of a metered liquor dispensing 
device. Whereas the mini-bottle contains 1.7 ounces of liquor, the metered 
device would be calibrated to dispense one ounce of liquor. The proposal to 
use a metered device has facial appeal. However, before the Citizens" 
Council can make a definitive recommendation with regard to the metered 
device, several questions must be answered: 
First, will the use of a metered device actually cut consumption of 
liquor significantly? Opponents have argued that consumers of alcohol may 
increase the number of drinks they order to offset, in part, the reduction in 
liquor in a given drink, thus leading to an increase in the profits made by 
private clubs. On the other hand, certainly the amount of liquor in a given 
drink would be reduced. However, it is not clear to the Citizens' Council that 
this would lead to a significant reduction in the consumption of liquor if the 
argument has merit that the number of drinks ordered on average would 
increase. The question of whether private club patrons drink a given 
number of drinks or drink to consume a desired amount of alcohol has not 
been definitively answered in the Council's hearings. The issue of reduced 
consumption has not been studied in depth nor any statistical evidence 
offered to support a conclusion of a significant reduction in liquor 
consumption. It should be pointed out that a persuasive common sense 
argument has been made that people who drink socially in a private club 
usually consume a finite number of drinks per hour and that this behavior 
will not be significantly altered if a metered device is used. 
The Citizens' Council believes its recommendation should take into 
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brings the drink to the table. The use of this device will not change the 
procedures of private club liquor distribution in any significant way. 
Opponents claim the real risk of this amendment is that the switch to a 
metered device in private clubs may lead to a clamor by restaurant 
proprietors that they should be allowed to use a metered device as well. Of 
course if a metered device was used in restaurants, for all practical purposes, 
the state would have liquor-by-the-drink. a concept rejected by the voters, 
since it would be infeasible to use a metered device and not have the 
bartender mil the drinks. The probable outcry for the use of a metered 
device in restaurants then is the most significant risk opponents foresee in 
allowing the metered device in private clubs. 
The Gtizens' Council feels that these issues should be examined 
further during the next year. The metered device proposal, if adopted, 
would represent a major change in the State's liquor laws. Before such a 
change is recommended, all of the ramifications of such a proposal should be 
examined and fully articulated. Al: -ugh this issue has surfaced several 
times over the years, it has been considered in only three hearings over a 
period of two months by the reorganized Citizens' Council. The Council is of 
the opinion that further public hearings and data on the use of the metered 
device and its impact on consumption and increased revenues would be 
helpful in further illuminating the issues and providing data on which a 
decision can be based. Over the next year, the Gtizens' Council intends to 
consider more fully the advantages and disadvantages of the metered device 
and intends to submit a report and recommendation on the metered device 
to the Legislature after its analysis has been completed. 
F THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL SUPPORTS A LAW THAT WOULD 
PROVIDE FOR A ONE TEA* DRIVER'S LICENSE DENIAL FOB MINORS 
CONVICTED OF ANT CRIME INVOLVING THE POSSESSION. USE OB 
ABUSE OF ALCOHOL OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
It is self-evident that alcohol use by minors is a significant societal 
problem. The Citizens' Council believes it is in the public interest to impose 
stringent sanctions on minors who are convicted of offenses involving the 
possession, use or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances. One of the most 
eagerly awaited and sought after privileges of teenagers is the privilege to 
drive. Utah grants this privilege to teenagers at the age of 16. The risk of 
loss of this privilege constitutes a deterrent to the use of alcohol by teens. 
Under Utah lav. a person must be 21 to purchase, possess or consume 
alcoholic beverages. This law represents a recognition that society should 
not encourage, and in fact, should prohibit the consumption of alcohol by 
minors. A law which would deny driving privileges to minors convicted of 
alcohol offenses is further recognition of society's desire to discourage 
teenage drinking. Furthermore, revocation of driving privileges to minors 
who drink advances public safety, as those who have a propensity to drink 
and then possibly drive are removed from the highways. 
The Citizens' Council recommends the enactment of a law providing 
that whenever a person 17 years of age or younger, is convicted of any 
offense or determined by a juvenile court to have committed any offense 
involving the possession, use or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances, the 
court in which the person is convicted shall prepare and send to the Office of 
Driver License Services, an order of denial of driving privileges for the 
person so convicted. The Act should also contain a provision that the court 
issuing such denial may, upon petition, review the order and may withdraw 
it However, the court should not be able to withdraw the order for a period 
of 90 days following issuance, if it is the first such order issued with 
respect to the person, or for one year if it is the second or subsequent such 
order issued. The Act should provide that upon receipt of the first order 
denying driving privileges, the Office of Driver License Services shall impose 
a suspension of driving privileges for one year, or until the person so 
suspended reaches 17. whichever is longer. Upon receipt of a second order 
denying driving privileges, the Office of Driver License Services shall 
suspend driving privileges for one year or until the person reaches 18 years 
of age. whichever is longer. This proposal is modeled after Oregon's Driver's 
License Denial law. [ See. H J. No. 44, Suspension of Juvenile Driving 
Privileges, filed by Representative Kim R. Burningham on October 16,1985 
which is very similar to the Oregon law.) 
In Oregon, where such a law has been in effect since 1983. there has 
been a significant reduction in juveniles arrested for various alcohol-related 
offenses. The following data has been provided by the Oregon Traffic Safety 
Commission: 
Juveniles, Arrested * Change 1982-1984 
DM - 17X (DUI arrests *2% overall) 
Open Container -45 X 
All Liquor Law Violations -12 % 
All Drug Law Violations -22% 
Of course, factors other than the driver's license denial law may explain, in 
part, the significant reductions in alcohol-related juvenile arrests but the 
stiff driver's license sanctions have most certainly contributed. 
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G THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL FAVORS CLEAR LABELING OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES WHICH REASONABLY APPRISES THE 
PUBLIC THAT THE BEVEIAGE CONTAINS ALCQSQL 
The Qtizens' Council recently became aware that beverages 
containing alcohol, i.e. "malt beverage coolers", which bore no indication that 
they contained alcohol were being sold in the state. The labels on these 
beverages merely stated "a malt beverage." In some grocery and 
convenience stores these beverages were found in the fsoda pop coolers. 
When the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control discovered these 
beverages were being sold in the state, it asked the distributors of these 
malt beverages to place a label on all such beverages indicating the beverage 
was an "alcoholic beverage". The distributors voluntarily complied vith the 
Department's request to label the beverages. 
While commending distributors of malt beverage coolers who have 
voluntarily labeled such beverages as alcoholic, the consensus of the Qtizens' 
Council is that state law should require such labeling. The Qtizens' Council is 
of the opinion that all beverages falling within the definition of alcoholic 
beverages as defined in S32A-1-5(1), (4) and (17) iluhCodi AM. (1985) 
should clearly indicate they are alcoholic beverages. However, since liquor 
and beer are already sufficiently identified, the Qtizens' Council is 
particularly concerned that beer coolers and other malted beverages bear 
an indication that they contain alcohol. Perhaps the Beer Wholesaling 
License Chapter can be amended to provide as an operational restriction 
that: "No (beer wholesaling] licensee shall sell or distribute any alcoholic 
beverage that is not clearly labeled in such a manner as is reasonably 
calculated to put the public on notice that the beverage is an alcoholic 
beverage. The beverage shall bear the label alcoholic beverage' or it shall 
bear a label containing the words "beer' or malt liquor' which in common 
usage apprises the general public that the beverage contains alcohol." See 
S32A-10-6 IttahQadfiAflli. (1983). 
It should be noted that the Qtizens' Council is not recommending that 
labeling of alcohol content be required. Federal statutes provide that malt 
beverage labeling and advertising shall not contain any statement 
concerning the alcohol content of the product unless required by state lav. 
§££ Sections 3(e) and 3(f) of the Federal Alcohol Admnistration Act, 27 U5.C 
SS 205(e) and (f). Although the state can require labeling of alcohol content, 
the Qtizens' Council heard testimony to the effect that labeling of alcohol 
content on malt beverage should be avoided, since the effects of 
differentiating the products by alcohol content may have a deleterious 
impact on the public interest if some consumers choose.to consume the 
beverage with the higher alcohol content. 
H THE CITIZENS-COUNCIL OPPOSES AN AMENDMENT TO PROHIBIT 
POLITICAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS FROM BEING GRANTED A 
SINGLE EVENT PEKMIT 
A proposal to amend the Single Event Permit Chapter of the Act to 
prohibit political parties from being granted a single event permit was also 
referred to the Qtizens' Council However, no one addressed the Council 
either in favor or in opposition to this proposed amendment. 
The Qtizens* Council is not in favor of this proposed amendment The 
consensus of the Council is that the Single Event Permit Chapter contains 
adequate safeguards and restrictions on the issuance of the single event 
permit. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission has plenary power to 
grant or deny single event permits. S32A-7-K4) Utah Cede. Ana.. (1985). 
The Commission must consider the times, dates, location and purpose of the 
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event, and shall determine where the liquor may he stored, sold and 
consumed at the event SS 32A-7-3(2)(c) and 32A-7-6(2)(e).(f). and (g) illaH 
code Ann. (1985). The Commission may consider other factors or 
circumstances it considers necessary to determine whether the permit 
should be granted. Rather than amending the Act to deal with specific 
organizations and events which, although meeting the facial requirements, 
should not be eligible for a permit the Legislature should allow the 
Commission to utilize its comprehensive criteria and to exercise its discretion 
in determining whether a single event permit should be granted. 
Furthermore, it was felt that responsible organizers of political 
nominating conventions would, in the exercise of common sense, self-police 
their own conventions and would limit the times that liquor was dispensed 
to when actual voting was not occurring, based on the realization that the 
voting process and alcohol consumption don't mix. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Citizens' Council recognises that these recommendations vill not 
please everyone. In the realm of alcoholic beverage regulation, controversy 
has repeatedly and consistently reared its head. Whatever 
recommendations are made, there are always those who say they go too far 
and those who say they don't go far enough. Our approach has been 
cautious. We have avoided a rush to judgment on issues which we believe 
deserve more consideration and which merit further public hearings in order 
to more fully elicit and ascertain public opinion. Furthermore, the 1985 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act has only been in effect since July 1985. The 
Citizens' Council recognizes that the Legislature may determine that major 
substantive changes in the Act should be examined only after there has been 
an opportunity to evaluate the performance and gauge the strengths and 
deficiencies in the 1985 Act 
Issues will continue to resurface. Further amendments to the law 
will most certainly be made over time. The Citizens' Council's task is on-
going and it will attempt to provide a forum for the fair consideration of all 
issues that may arise involving alcoholic beverages and laws related to their 
sale, purchase and consumption. 
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Submitted this S O . day of November, 1985. 
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